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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
Though the events preceding and accompanying World War
II have, in their wake, left the death of millions, only one group was
singled out for extermination by the Nazis and their supporters -
the Jews. This program of genocide was predicated upon only one
criterion - race.
Except for the slaughter of the Armenians by the Turks in
1915, there has never been another episode when one group of peo-
ple has been singled out by another group for systematic destruc-
tion simply because they were members of a different racial, ethnic,
or religious community.I Certainly, there have been other acts of
genocide in the history of humankind, but never on the exclusive
basis of the victim's racial status. These other events, including
those in recent times which resulted in the killing of millions of
Biafrans, Bengalis, and Cambodians were committed in the course
of a political struggle and ended with the resolution of the political
conflict.
The term "Holocaust" has become an intricate part of modem
Jewish history and culture. That dark period of history has been
insufficiently reported in recent times and its lessons tend to fade
into the history of the Jews instead of being made an indelible part
of humankind's record. This article is a study of those interna-
tional law aspects relevant to the holocaust.
I. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE LAW OF WAR
A. An Introduction to the Origins and Development of the
Regulation of Armed Conflict and Its Enforcement2
The humanization of armed conflicts has been the object of
* Professor of Law, DePaul University, Chicago; Secretary-General, International As-
sociation of Penal Law, Paris; Dean, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences, Siracusa, Italy.
This article was written as part of a National Project on the Holocaust conducted by
Spertus College of Judaica in Chicago under grants from the National Endowment for the
Humanities and the Hyman and Susan Wein Foundation of Chicago.
1. Some have claimed that genocide was committed by the United States against the
American Indian in the Nineteenth Century and against the Vietnamese in the Twentieth
Century. See Appendices A & B infra for a brief discussion of these claims.
2. This introduction is based on an article by the author entitled An Appraisal of the
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regulation by every civilization for centuries. In the Fourth Cen-
tury B.C., a Chinese writer, in a book entitled The Art of War,
3
described the prevailing customs of sparing the wounded and the
elderly. About that same period, in the Hindu civilization, a body
of rules regulating war on land was embodied in the Book of
Manu.4 In the Second Millennium B.C., the Egyptians had treaties
with other peoples, such as the Summerians, regulating the conduct
of war and the manner in which it was to be initiated. The Ancient
Greeks had rules on sanctuary, the treatment of the wounded, and
the treatment of prisoners.
The Ancient Greeks had developed an elaborate code based
on "universal law" designed to contain the suffering and destruc-
tion of warfare. Ironically, it was the barbarian King Xerxes who,
upon learning that the Greeks had murdered some of his envoys,
refused suggestions of retaliation on the ground that the Greeks
had violated the law of all mankind, and that he would not do the
very thing of which he accused them.6
Other diverse and ancient societies have also sought to regu-
late the use of force in armed conflict. In addition to the examples
mentioned above, research has shown the existence of limitations
on the use of force by the Mayas since approximately the Sixth
Century A.D., by the Japanese since the Tenth Century, and by the
Incas since the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. In medieval Eu-
rope, the codes of chivalry and the law of arms restricted violence
to the class of knights and prohibited the use of such weapons as
the crossbow, the arbalist, the Harquebus, and poison.7
The Muslim practices in war - since 623 A.D. - were care-
fully regulated in terms of the initiation and conduct of war and
were recorded in Saybani's teachings in the Eighth Century.8 In
the Middle Ages, in several landmark Councils, the Catholic
Growth and Developing Trends of International Criminal Law, 46 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE
DROIT PENAL 1 (1975).
3. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (L. Giles trans. 1944).
4. 7 COMMENTARIES: THE LAWS OF MANU (G. Bdhler trans. 1967).
5. See A. AYMARD & J. AUBOYER, I L'ORIENT ET LA GRE'CE ANTIQUE 293-99 (1953);
P. ROUSSEL, P. CLOCHE & R. GROUSSET, LA GRECE ET L'ORIENT DES GUERRES MEDI-
QUES A LA CONQUETE ROMAINE (2d ed. 1938); C. FITZGERALD, PEACE AND WAR IN ANTIQ-
UITY (1931). For an account of the Roman Armies and reference to Greece, see M. GRANT,
THE ARMY OF THE CAESARS (1974).
6. C. FENWICK, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (4th ed. 1965).
7. H. MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-40 (2d ed. 1894); FENWICK, SUpra note 6, at
667.
8. For cases and practices in international law and relations taught by AI-Shaybani in
the Eighth Century, published in Haiderbad in 1335-1336 A.D., see A1-Shaybani, Siyyar-,41-
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Church set forth certain prescriptions regulating the conduct of
war.9 These Councils were essentially concerned with the Cru-
sades, but they also regulated the initiation and conduct of war.
Subsequent canonic writers developed the Christian philosophy of
the "just war,"'0 including St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274),'' Vit-
toria (1483-1546), 12 Suarez (1548-1584)," 3 Alaya (1548-1617),
14
Gentili (1552-1608),15 and Grotius (1583-1648), 16 who collectively
set forth a complete doctrinal basis for war and peace and the regu-
lation of armed conflicts. Since the Sixteenth Century, numerous
writings on the regulation of armed conflicts have advanced the hu-
manitarian philosophy expressed by these earlier positions.
The regulations noted above also extended to the practice of
reprisal which historically has been limited to making the enemy
desist from illegal practices of warfare by demonstrating a willing-
ness and ability to do the same. Reprisals were not resorted to
lightly. For example, a Thirteenth Century English practice re-
quired ten conditions precedent for reprisals, one of which was a
demand for satisfaction made and refused. Only after the ten con-
ditions were satisfied would the Crown grant letters of reprisal, and
even then the authorization was limited and defined.' 7
The promulgation of general orders embodying certain rules
of warfare is exemplified in early Swedish regulations. In 1621,
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden promulgated his Articles of Military
Laws To Be Observed in the Wars, providing in the general article,
Shaybani, in M. KHADDURI, ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS (1966); see also M. KHADDURI,
WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM (1955).
9. These Councils were: (1) the First Lateran Council of 1122; (2) the Second Lateran
Council of 1139 (which particularly forbade the use of the crossbow); (3) the Third Lateran
Council of 1215; (4) the First Council of Lyon of 1245; and (5) the Second Council of Lyon
of 1274.
10. See, e.g., FITZGERALD, supra note 5; M. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE
AGES (1965).
11. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1260), in which the author relied on the Greek classics
such as Homer, Plato, Aristotle, the Roman Cicero, and Saint Augustine.
12. F. Vittoria, De Indis et de lyre Be/li Reflectiones, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (J. Scott ed. 1917).
13. F. SUAREZ, On War, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS, in II CLASSICS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 797-865 (J. Scott ed. 1944).
14. B. AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF WAR, in I1 CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (J. Bate trans. 1912).
15. A. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRE TRES, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (J.
Scott ed. 1933).
16. H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(J. Scott ed. 1925).
17. Clark, The English Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J.
INT'L L. 694 (1933).
Vol. 9
4
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inter alia, that "no Colonel or Captain shall command his soldiers
to do any unlawful thing; which one so does, shall be punished
according to the discretion of the Judges."' Another example is
found in the United States where the First Articles of War,
19
promulgated in 1775, contained explicit provisions for the punish-
ment of officers who failed to keep "good order" among the
troops.20 These provisions were retained and strengthened in the
Articles of War of 180621 and served as the basis for prosecuting
conduct "against the law of nations. "22 The most noteworthy regu-
lation in the United States is the Leiber Code of 1863,23 which be-
came a model for many countries.
The above sketch provides some random examples drawn
from a variety of cultures over a span of many centuries. They all
indicate the gradual development of a worldwide consensus con-
cerning the humanization of war and the attempt to regulate armed
conflicts. The "modem law of war"24 is the product of warring ex-
periences - whose beginnings can be traced to the Napoleonic
Wars - which brought about enormous suffering and devastation.
The slow awakening of a humane consciousness throughout the
world community resulted in the formulation of numerous treaties
on the humanization of war, including the formulation of forty-
seven multilateral treaties between 1856 and 1973. These treaties
share the purpose of humanizing armed conflicts and reducing the
level of harm and suffering that such conflicts usually engender.
18. Gross, The Punishment of War Criminals. The Nuremberg Trial (Firs/part), 11 NETH.
INT'L L. REV. 356 (1955).
19. The First Articles of War were adopted by resolution of June 30, 1775. I JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 90 (Lib. of Cong. ed. 1904-1937). These
were repealed and replaced by Articles of War authorized by resolution of Sept. 20, 1776.
Id. at 435-82.
20. Id. arts. IXX (1775) & IX (1776).
21. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. XX, 2 Stat. 359, art. 32. These provisions were modeled
extensively on the British Articles of War. Sherman, The Civilianization fMilitary Law, 22
ME. L. REV. 3, 6 (1970); G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (3d rev. ed. 1918). This provision survives in weakened form in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, art. 138, 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1959).
22. See Henfield's Case, II F. Cas. 1099 (C.C. D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (violation of
principles of neutrality by civilian).
23. Promulgated as Instructions for Officers and Noncommissioned Officers on Outpost
and Patrol Duty and Troops in Campaign by Order of the Secretary of War, in Washington
D.C. (War Dep't Classification No. WI. 12: Ou 8, 1863). For other similar rules in the United
States, see WAR DEP'T, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 132 (Doc. No. 467, Apr. 25, 1914); DEP'T
OF THE ARmY, Dep't of the Army Field Manual 176 (Doc. No. 27-10, July 18, 1956). Seealso
DAVIS, supra note 21, which traces the history of the First Articles of War of 1775.
24. "Modem law of war" is an anachronism since, in modem times, "war" is not lawful
under customary and conventional international law except in the case of self-defense.
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It is noteworthy that in the course of the history of the regula-
tion of armed conflicts, states have always been more willing to
codify rules which should have been applied to the preceding war.
In essence, this is the problem of an evolutionary system of law
which relies on the past to chart its future but which is still reluctant
to restrict the main purpose of war - military victory. This ex-
plains in part why there have been so few instances throughout his-
tory when states individually or collectively enforced violations of
the law of armed conflicts.
The first prosecution for initiating an unjust war is reported to
have been in Naples in 1268 when Conradin von Hohenstafen was
put to death for that reason. 25 The first reported international pros-
ecution for war crimes was the prosecution of one Peter von
Hagenbach in Breisach, Germany in 1474.26 Peter von Hagenbach
was tried before a tribunal of twenty-eight judges from the allied
states of the Holy Roman Empire. While he was not tried for
crimes committed during the war, this trial is significant in that von
Hagenbach was stripped of his knighthood by an international tri-
bunal which found him guilty of murder, rape, perjury, and other
crimes "against the law of God and man" in the execution of a
military occupation.27 In 1689, James II of England, though then
in exile, relieved one Count Rosen of all further military duties, not
for the failure of his mission, but because his siege of Londonderry
was outrageous and included the murder of innocent civilians.
28
Among the landmark cases in history involving the prosecu-
tion of war crimes are those which occurred during the American
Revolution - with the trial of Captain Nathan Hale by a British
military court and Major John Andre by a board of officers ap-
pointed by George Washington 29 - and in the post-Civil War trial
of Confederate Major Henry Wirz for his role in the death of sev-
eral thousand Union prisoners in the Andersonville prison.30 The
25. Bierzanek, War Crimes.- History and Defnition, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 560 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as I BASSIOUNI
& NANDA]. See also Bellot, The Detention of Vapoleon Bonaparte, 39 COMP. L. Q. REV. 170
(1923), on the decision of the Congress of Aix La Chapelle of 1810 on the detention of
Napoleon for waging wars which disturbed the peace of the world.
26. Schwarzenberg, The Breisach War Crime Trial of 1474, The Manchester Guardian,
Sept. 28, 1946, at 4, col. 6; DE BARRANTE, IX-X HISTOIRE DES Ducs DE BOURGOGNE (1937).
27. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 61 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1973).
28. Id.
29. See Colby, War Crimes, 23 MICH. L. REV. 482 (1925).
30. See 8 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 657 (J. Lawson ed. 1917). The Proceedings of the
Military Commission were published in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-815
(1868); see also A. ROACH, THE PRISONER OF WAR AND How TREATED (1865).
Vol. 9
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United States also convened war crime tribunals after the Spanish-
American War and after the occupation of the Philippines. 3
Following World War I, the Treaty of Versailles32 established
the punishability of war criminals. The Treaty ordered the prose-
cution of Kaiser Wilheim II by an international tribunal,3 3 that
Germany surrender to the Allies all Germans accused of war
crimes to be tried by military tribunals, 34 and that the Allies estab-
lish national war crimes tribunals. 35 A special body, known as the
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties, was constituted to report on the per-
sons to be prosecuted. The Commission issued its report on Febru-
ary 3, 1920.36 In the report, the Allies submitted to Germany the
names of 896 alleged war criminals. For political reasons, however,
that list shrank to forty-five and, of these, Germany tried only
twelve before the Supreme Court of the Reich convened at Leip-
zig. 37 This introduction is the historical background against which
World War II prosecutions took place.
31. See Court Martial of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, Manila, P.I., Apr. 1902, S.
Doc. No. 213, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2-17 (1902); Court Martial of Lt. Preston Brown, Ma-
nila, P.I., June 1902, S. Doc. No. 213, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1902).
32. Treaty of Peace with Germany, done June 28, 1919, 112 BRIT. & FOR. ST. PAPERS 1,
[1919] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 4 [hereinafter cited as Versailles Treaty], reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L
L. 151 (Supp. 1919) (official documents).
33. Id. art. 227. The Kaiser was never tried because he sought refuge in Holland which
refused to extradite him on the grounds that the crime with which he was charged was a
"political offense," and hence exempt from extradition. See Wright, The Legal Liability of
the Kaiser, 13 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 120 (1919). On the question of the political offense excep-
tion and international crimes, see M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 425-41 (1974) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION];
Bassiouni, The Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in Extra-
dition - 4 Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217,
241-43 (1969). For an analysis of the criminal provisions of the Versailles Treaty, see H.-H.
JESCHECK, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER STRAATSORGANE NACH VOLKERSTRAFECHT
(1952). It is noteworthy that the 1920 Treaty of S~vres with Turkey, see note 62 infra, and its
successor, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, see id., only had a clause (article 230) to the effect
that Turkey would hand over to the Allies those war criminals which may be requested.
However, none were requested and therefore no prosecutions of Turkish violators occurred.
34. Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, art. 228.
35. Id. art. 229.
36. See, e.g., Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14
AM. J. INT'L L. 70 (1920).
37. Six of the twelve defendants were acquitted. The two major prosecutions were The
Dover Castle, 2 Ann. Dig. 429 (Reichsgericht 1921) and The Llandovery Castle, 2 Ann. Dig.
436 (Reichsgericht 1921). See also C. MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921).
7
International Law Journal: Table of Contents
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
B. The Prosecution of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
After World War II
1. The Basis for Prosecution. The precedents described
above clearly indicate that "[tjhe right of the belligerent to punish
as war criminals persons who violate the laws or customs of war is a
well-recognized principle of international law."38 Thus, the Allied
forces, on November 1, 1943, stated their intention to put this prin-
ciple into effect, declaring that "atrocities, massacres and cold
blooded mass executions which [were] being perpetrated by the
Hitlerite forces . . . should be the object of criminal prosecu-
tions and punishment. The United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union, "speaking in the interest of the 32 United
Nations,"4 declared that those responsible for the atrocities would
be returned to the countries where the acts were committed in order
to be tried and punished "according to the laws of [those] liberated
countries and of the Free Governments which [shall] be erected
therein.' In the case of major criminals "whose offenses [had] no
particular geographical location, ' 42 punishment would be the prod-
uct of a joint decision of the Allies.43
The decision of the Allies regarding the method of trying the
major criminals was embodied in the London Agreement" of Au-
gust 8, 1945 and its accompanying Charter. The London Agree-
ment provided that "after consultation with the Control Council for
Germany, '4 5 an international military tribunal for the trial of war
criminals "whose offenses have no particular geographical loca-
tion"'  would be established. The constitution, jurisdiction, and
functions of the international military tribunal were contained in
the accompanying Charter. Together, the London Agreement and
Charter were the constitutive authority for the International Mili-
tary Tribunal (Tribunal) at Nuremberg. The prosecution of indi-
38. R. WRIGHT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 29
(1948). See also Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 61 (1944).
39. Moscow Declaration, in 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1944) (official documents).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. London Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945 [hereinafter cited as London Agreement], with
accompanying Charter, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter cited as Charter], re-
printed in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (Supp. 1945) (official documents).
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viduals to be charged with certain international crimes was to be
divided between the Tribunal, whose function was to try major ac-
cused criminals, and the Allies who, in their respective zones of
occupation, would try other accused criminals.
The law embodied in the Charter was "decisive and binding
upon the Tribunal."47 It provided that "[tihe Tribunal ...shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the inter-
ests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as
members of organizations, committed any of the following crimes:
(a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against human-
ity. '
'48
Crimes against peace, a relatively new concept which grew out
of World War I, were viewed as the ultimate international crime.49
The concept of "crimes against humanity" was a novelty, and what
"crimes against humanity" meant in 1946, as well as how it was
applied in the Nuremberg trials, must be clearly understood if the
impact of Nuremberg on international criminal law is to be accu-
rately evaluated. Crimes against humanity related to a body of
doctrine concerning the protection of human rights applicable at
war and at peace. The problems it posed were many.
2. Development of the Concept of "Crimes Against Hu-
manity." The first application of the concept of "crimes against
humanity" was in the context of war. Thus, a legal basis for it had
to be found in the law of war. That basis was identified as the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 Concerning the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land5" (Hague Convention) in which it is stated
that "the inhabitants and the belligerents shall remain under the
protection of and subject to the principles of the law of nations, as
established by the usages prevailing among civilized nations, by the
laws of humanity, and by the demands of public conscience."'I
Thus, the 1907 statement concerning the "laws of humanity"
47. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG, JUDGMENT, 218 (Nov.
1, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946) (published by the Secretariat of the Tribunal, Nuremberg 1947-
1949) [hereinafter cited as INDICTMENT, PROCEEDINGS, or JUDGMENT].
48. Charter, supra note 44, art. 61.
49. "It is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 213.
50. The Second Hague Peace Conference, Fourth Hague Convention Regarding the
Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, done Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [herein-
after cited as Land Warfare Convention], with Annex, Regulations Concerning the Laws and
Customs of Land Warfare [hereinafter cited as Regulations], reprinted n 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90
(Supp. 1908) (official documents).
51. Land Warfare Convention, supra note 50, preamble (emphasis added).
9
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was deemed one of the authoritative legal sources of international
law which supported the 1945 claim to prosecute and punish those
who committed crimes against humanity.52 But "laws of human-
ity" were not defined by the Hague Convention, nor did the accom-
panying Regulations53 (Hague Regulations) concerning land
warfare refer to any specific violations as crimes against humanity.
Thus, a precedent was needed to give a more substantive defini-
tional content to the contemplated crimes. That was found in the
1915 massacres of Armenians of Turkish citizenship encouraged
and condoned by Turkish authorities. At that time, the govern-
ments of France, Great Britain, and Russia declared that the mas-
sacres constituted "crimes against humanity and civilization,"
'5 4
and that all the members of the Turkish government would be held
responsible. This was the first time that crimes against humanity
were given a substantive meaning which placed criminal responsi-
bility on individuals as well as states, whether in time of war or
peace. Nevertheless, these crimes were not within the prohibitions
of the Hague Regulations. Additional support was sought in con-
nection with the First World War efforts to prosecute the German
Empire and its allies as well as individuals from allied countries.
To that end, in January 1919, the Preliminary Peace Conference of
Paris (Paris Peace Conference) decided to convene a commission of
fifteen members (Committee of Fifteen) who, among other things,
would find facts relating to violations of the laws and customs of
war committed by the German Empire and its allies.55 The Com-
mittee of Fifteen found that breaches of the laws and customs of
war had been committed,56 as well as violations of the laws of hu-
manity, and concluded that "all persons belonging to enemy Coun-
tries . . . who have been guilty of offenses against the laws and
customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prose-
cution."57 Thus, the warning issued to the Turkish government
four years earlier by the Triple Entente that those responsible for
the Armenian massacre would be held accountable was acted upon
52. The laws of humanity would represent general principles of law and thus provide
one source of international law. See L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-31 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht 1955).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 35.
55. The Committee was also to report on the procedures to be employed for trying those
individuals responsible for the commission of war crimes. Id. at 32.
56. The Committee of Fifteen compiled a list of 32 war crimes. Id.
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by the Committee of Fifteen. 8 These crimes, however, did not fall
within the traditional definition of war crimes.5 9 The 1919 distinc-
tion between "war crimes" and crimes against the "laws of human-
ity," however, was not formally embodied in any of the peace
treaties concluded after the First World War. The reason was that
the two American members of the Committee of Fifteen objected to
the inclusion of a reference to violations of the laws of humanity in
the Versailles Peace Treaty. Their view was that war by its very
nature was inhumane and, therefore, that acts consistent with the
laws of war, although inhumane, were not punishable. Considering
the difficulty in determining a universal standard for humanity, the
United States delegates concluded: "[a] judicial tribunal only deals
with existing law and only administers existing law, leaving to an-
other forum infractions of the moral law and actions contrary to the
laws and principles of humanity. ' 60 The United States position
prevailed and no provision regarding the commission of crimes
against the laws of humanity was contained in the 1919 Versailles
Peace Treaty.6' It should be noted, however, that the Treaty of
Svres between the Allies and Turkey did contain an article which
stated as an offense "the massacres committed during the continu-
ance of the state of war on territory which formed part of the Turk-
ish Empire on . . . August [1,] 1914. ' '62 Nevertheless, the Treaty of
Sevres was never ratified. It was replaced, in 1923, by the Treaty of
Lausanne 63 which did not contain a similar provision. On the con-
trary, the latter Treaty granted amnesty to all persons who commit-
ted such offenses during the period 1914-1922.60 Thus, the
commission of offenses by a government against its own nationals,
which was covered by article 6(C)65 of the 1945 London Charter,
had not, in 1923, become part of conventional or customary inter-
national law. Indeed, the laws of humanity mentioned as a source
58. Similar offenses committed by the Germans were also made prosecutable.
59. Thus, in 1945, they gave rise to the need to create a special category of offenses
which the London Charter distinguished from war crimes. See Charter, supra note 44, art.
6(c) and Schwelb, supra note 57, at 181. See also note 69 infra.
60. Schwelb, supra note 57, at 181-82.
61. The only offenders to be prosecuted were those "accused of having committed acts
in violation of the laws and customs of war." Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, art. 228(2).
62. Treaty of Sivres, art. 230, quotedin Schwelb, supra note 57, at 182.
63. Treaty of Lausanne, done July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, 117 BRIT. & FOR. ST. PA-
PERS 543 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Lausanne], reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. I (Supp.
1924) (official documents).
64. Id. Declaration of Amnesty, art. I.
65. See text accompanying note 69 infra.
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of international law in the Hague Convention of 1907 did not ripen
into substantive international crimes until 1945.
In 1919, the notion had prevailed that a crime against the
"laws of humanity" was too indeterminate to become a part of in-
ternational law. However, the World War II horrors that the Nazis
committed against civilian populations in Europe left little question
as to whether the standards of humanity were still too indetermi-
nate or vague in respect of what had been done; yet legally, the
1919 precedent was still valid. In retrospect, the chairman of the
United Nations War Crimes Commission noted the United States
position on that question at Versailles in 1919:
They said there was no fixed and universal standard of human-
ity . . . . They referred to the place of equity in the Anglo-
American legal system and to John Seldon's definition of equity
as a roguish thing. But, . . . equity has established itself as a
regular branch of [the American] legal system. Equally it might
be said that negligence is too indeterminate to constitute a legal
head of liability, but ... in the Anglo-American law of tort it
has become one of the widest and most comprehensive and most
important categories of liability.
If these elastic standards are of as wide utility as they have
proved to be there is no reason why the doctrine of crimes against
humanity should not be equally valid and valuable in
[nternational flaw. That law deals with large concepts and not
with the meticulous distinctions of /munic~pal [law.
66
Lord Wright's statement was a correct formulation of the common
law of crimes. It did not, however, conform to United States re-
quirements of specificity of crimes nor to the European require-
ments embodied in the legal principles nullum crimen sine lege and
nullapoena sine lege.
Indeed the concept of "laws of humanity" and its successor
"crimes against humanity" were unusually vague and could hardly
satisfy the requirements of specificity of a criminal statute. Never-
theless, the acts committed against civilians during World War II
did unequivocally violate the provisions of the Hague Convention
which contained specific provisions67 prohibiting the conduct in
question. Furthermore, the 1864 and 1929 Red Cross Conven-
tions68 covered some of the acts later included in the 1945 under-
66. Wright, War Crimes Under Iniernational Law, 62 LAW. Q. REV. 40, 48-49 (1946)
(emphasis added).
67. See Land Warfare Convention, supra note 50, arts. 42-56.
68. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and
Wounded of Armies in the Field, done Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377, 55 BRIT. &
Vol. 9
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standing of crimes against humanity. It must be emphasized,
however, that these earlier prohibitions of certain acts against civil-
ians were related to the conduct of war but did not apply to peace-
time.
Thus, those who framed the London Charter had to extrapo-
late the notion of crimes against humanity from a larger concept
than had been recognized so far. The definitions of war crimes and
crimes against humanity overlapped in several areas. They were
respectively defined as follows:
b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other pur-
pose of civilian populations of or in occupied territory ....
c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or per-
secutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.69
Thus, for example, crimes committed against civilian populations
in occupied territories would be war crimes. At the same time,
these offenses also would fall within the definition of crimes against
humanity if the "civilian population of or in occupied territory" is
included within the meaning of the phrase "any civilian popula-
tion." Similarly, "deportation to slave labour" is a war crime and is
included within the term "enslavement" which is also defined as a
crime against humanity.
As a practical matter, most offenses committed during World
War II could fit either category of crimes against humanity or war
crimes. The significant difference between the two is that war
crimes could be committed, logically enough, only during a war,
while crimes against humanity could be committed outside or dur-
ing the war. Therefore, the words "before or during the war" im-
plied that international law contained penal sanctions against
individuals applicable not only in time of war but also in time of
peace. This, however, presupposes the "existence of a system of
international law under which individuals are responsible to the
FOR. ST. PAPERS 43, reprinted in I AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (Supp. 1907) (official documents);
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, done July
27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847, reprinted in 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (Supp. 1933) (official
documents).
69. Charter, supra note 44, art. 6(b) & (c) (emphasis added).
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community of nations for violations of rules of international crimi-
nal law ... ."o This concept of individual responsibility had
been established in 1945 byfew precedents. Nevertheless, by 1946,
the precedent was set, albeit in a very vague way. This new inter-
national crime, which relied upon the concept of what meaning the
words "laws of humanity" could be given, "[was] used in a non-
technical sense and certainly not with the intention of indicating a
set of norms different from the laws and customs of war; the viola-
tions of which constituted war crimes within the meaning of Article
6(b) of the [London] Charter."'"
3. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The
framers of the London Charter were faced with the problems at-
tendant to the creation of an international tribunal which was to
operate on the basis of rules yet to be agreed to by its creators.
Among these problems were the procedures to be employed in the
proceedings, such as how to profer charges and what rules of evi-
dence to use. The conflict between the various legal systems repre-
sented was ultimately resolved in favor of the Anglo-American
adversary system which was used most prevalently. Thus, each de-
fendant was presented with an indictment or statement of the
charges against him, each was entitled to counsel, to present evi-
dence, to testify in his own behalf and, particularly, to cross-ex-
amine prosecution witnesses. European lawyers and judges who
were unaccustomed to cross-examination techniques found difficul-
ties with it, but cross-examination did not play a critical role in the
trial since the prosecution called only thirty-three witnesses. This
was due to the fact that United States prosecutors - whose influ-
ence was significant - took the position that the case against the
defendants should be based primarily upon abundantly available
documentary evidence. Justice Jackson's view was that "the disin-
terestedness and unquestioned authenticity of documents settle[d]
doubts which always would linger if the same story were told by
witnesses, the best of whom always are open to suspicion of bias,
bad memory, and influence."72 The Tribunal consisted of four
judges, one from each of the four major Allies.73
Twenty-four individuals were named in the indictment as de-
70. Schwelb, supra note 57, at 179.
71. Id. at 180. For relevant portions of the indictment, see Appendix C infra, p. 278.
72. R. JACKSON, THE NURNBERG CASE viii (1947).
73. The prosecution, as well, consisted of four teams - one from each of the Allied
countries. See Charter, supra note 44, art. 14.
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fendants.74 They were charged with ten categories of war crimes in
count three, and with three categories of crimes against humanity
in count four.7 5 The facts alleged by the prosecution as constituting
war crimes were also relied on as constituting crimes against hu-
manity under count four.76 Thus, crimes against humanity became
the more inclusive category of crime. It included those acts com-
mitted against civilian populations before the war" as being "the
persecution on political, racial and religious grounds.
'7 8
The charges brought against the defendants were stated in the
indictment in general language. For example, Goering, according
to the indictment, had "authorized, directed and participated...
in War Crimes. . . and. . . Crimes against Humanity. . . includ-
74. See Appendix C infra, p. 279. Defendant Ley committed suicide prior to the trial,
and Krupp was found unfit to stand trial, leaving 22 defendants. Bormann was tried in
absteniia on the belief, although unproven, that he was dead.
75. The ten categories of war crimes listed in the indictment were: (I) murder and ill-
treatment of belligerents' civilian populations; (2) deportation of belligerents' civilian popu-
lations for slave labor and for other purposes; (3) murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of
war; (4) killing of hostages; (5) plunder of public and private property; (6) extraction of
collective penalties; (7) wanton destruction of cities, towns, and villages not justified by mili-
tary necessity; (8) conscription of civilian labor; (9) forcing civilians to swear allegiance to a
hostile power; and (10) germanization of occupied territories. I INDICTMENT, supra note 47,
at 43-63.
76. The following definition of crimes against humanity represents the general under-
standing of the term at the time of the trial:
A crime against humanity is an offense against certain general principles of law
which, in certain circumstances, becomes the concern of the international commu-
nity, namely, if it has repercussions reaching across international frontiers, or if it
passes in "magnitude or savagery any limits of what is tolerable by modem civiliza-
tions."
Schwelb, supra note 57, at 195.
77. These were: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts before and during the war. Those acts committed during the war were essentially the
acts alleged as constituting war crimes under count three. Those acts committed before the
war, for example, the establishment of German concentration camps, which did not fall
within the traditional definition of war crimes, constituted a separate charge in the indict-
ment.
78. Under this second category - persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds
- the indictment charged that "Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933, they were
deprived of liberty, thrown into concentration camps where they were murdered and ill-
treated. Their property was confiscated." I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 40. These acts
also came within two additional categories of "crimes against humanity" under count four.
War crimes, which were incorporated in count four as constituting crimes against humanity,
included the charge of
deliberate and systematic genocide, Piz, the extermination of racial and national
groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied territories in order to
destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial or religious
groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.
Id. at 43-44.
15
International Law Journal: Table of Contents
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ing a wide variety of crimes against persons and property."7 9 Such
crimes could fall within any of the ten categories of war crimes or
the three categories of crimes against humanity, such as crimes
against civilian populations committed before the war, and perse-
cution on political, racial, or religious grounds during the war.
That was clear in Goering's case who, for example, had issued a
decree on July 31, 1941 directing Himmler and Heydrich to "bring
about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German
sphere of influence in Europe."" ° Such a direction clearly consti-
tuted "ill treatment ...of civilian populations of or in occupied
territory," a war crime under article 6(b), and at the same time "ex-
termination or persecution on religious grounds," a crime against
humanity under article 6(c) of the London Charter. The confusion
between war crimes and crimes against humanity could also be
seen in the Tribunal's judgment which did not distinguish between
war crimes and crimes against humanity. The assumption was that
they saw no need to do so because crimes against humanity in-
cluded war crimes committed against civilian populations."' This
was reflected in the case of the sixteen defendants who were
charged with and tried for both the commission of war crimes and
crimes against humanity; each was found guilty of both charges or
innocent of both charges.82
79. See note 83 infra.
80. See I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 282.
81. According to article 6(c), crimes against humanity could be committed against "any
civilian populations," and by the terms of article 6(b), war crimes could be committed
against "civilian populations of or in occupied territory." The latter population is included
in the former.
82. See Appendix D infra, p. 289-90. The indictment, in that it charged a conspiracy to
commit all crimes alleged, did not specify which particular acts each defendant was responsi-
ble for. Rather, it gave a general description of the war crimes and crimes against humanity
attributable to each defendant. Defendants Goring, Hess, Rosenberg, Seyss-Inquart, Jodi,
and Bormann were all charged with a "wide variety of crimes against persons and property."
I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 68, 70, 71, 77 & 76. Hess was sentenced to life imprison-
ment, Goering committed suicide before he could be hanged, and Bormann was not appre-
hended. The rest were hanged. Charged with "a wide variety of crimes against persons and
property" in occupied territories were Ribbentrop, Frick, and Neurath. 1d. at 69, 72 & 76.
Ribbentrop and Frick were hanged and Neurath was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
Kaltenbrunner was charged with "crimes against humanity" involved in the system of con-
centration camps. Id. at 70. He was subsequently hanged. Frank was charged with "war
crimes" and "crimes against humanity" involved in the administration of occupied territo-
ries. Id. at 74. He also was hanged. Sauchel was charged with "forcing inhabitants of occu-
pied territories to work as slave laborers in occupied territories and in Germany." Id. at 73.
He was hanged. Funk was charged with "crimes against persons and property" in connec-
tion with the economic exploitation of occupied territories. Id. at 74. He was sentenced to
life imprisonment. Streicher was charged with "incitement of the persecution of the Jews."
Id. at 77. He also was hanged. Keitel was charged with "ill-treatment of prisoners of war
Vol. 9
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Since the facts supporting the charges were unquestionable,
the issues raised by the defendants at trial were essentially ques-
tions of law, the threshold question, of course, being that of the
Tribunal's legitimacy.
The provisions of the London Charter were for the most part
quite clear;83 the issue soon became whether its provisions could, in
conformity with existing international law, be applied at all. Obvi-
ously, a nation that surrenders unconditionally as Germany had
done is in no position to resist whatever action the victorious forces
deem appropriate. But it was the view of the Tribunal that the
London Charter did not represent "an arbitrary exercise of power
on the part of the victorious nations84 but was the expression of
international law existing at the time of its creation."85 The United
States was particularly eager to set the example of a valid precedent
which could not be labelled "victor's vengeance." In this respect,
the defendants and their lawyers were helpful in that they forced
the Tribunal and the prosecutors constantly to seek justifications
for their actions and hence to articulate the past, present, and future
of international law. It is this reasoned elaboration which is the
contribution of Nuremberg to the law of nations and "the record on
which history [must] judge [the victors]." 86
4. Some Legal Issues Concerning the Nuremberg Tribunal and
and of civilian populations of occupied territories." Id. He was also hanged. Charged with
war crimes on the high seas (not a crime against humanity) were Raeder and Donitz. Id. at
76, 79. They were sentenced to imprisonment for life and 10 years respectively. Charged
with anti-Jewish measures and ruthless exploitation of occupied territories were Schirach
and Fritzsche. Id. Schirach received a 20 year term, whereas Fritzche was acquitted. Speer
was charged with exploitation of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive
war. Id. at 73. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Papen and Schact were not
charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity; both were acquitted under counts one
and two.
The defendants' guilt was, generally, established by participation in joint decisions to
commit, and issuance of orders to commit, war crimes and crimes against humanity. For
example, "by a decree of 31 July 1941, [Goring] directed Himmler and Heydrich to 'bring
about a complete solution of the Jewish question' in the German sphere of influence in Eu-
rope." I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 282. Ribbentrop, meanwhile, had participated in a
conference concerning the deportation of Jews from Hungary, at which time he said that
"Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps." Id. at 287. See also E.
DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966).
83. Article 6 of the Charter included as an offense, conspiracy "to commit any of the
foregoing crimes." The Tribunal limited conspiracy only to crimes against peace, see I
JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 226, and gave it a meaning much narrower than the prosecutors
had sought. Id. at 225.
84. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 218.
85. Id.
86. JACKSON, supra note 72, at 33-34.
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the Charges. Article 6 of the London Charter makes it clear that
individuals are responsible for acts defined as criminal therein.
Therefore, the view that international law is applicable only to
states who are bound to perform it according to the obligations to
which they have explicitly agreed87 was implicitly rejected by the
framers of the Charter. Subsequently, the Tribunal also rejected
the contention that the Hague Regulations could not be applied be-
cause various belligerents were not a party to them.88 The Hague
Regulations, said the Tribunal, were a recognition of the laws and
customs of war then existing (in 1907), which by 1939 "were recog-
nized by all civilized states."8 9 By affirming these laws and cus-
toms, the principal source of international law - namely, treaties
- was circumvented in respect of their applicability to their signa-
tories. Both the Charter and the Tribunal construed the law of
treaties so broadly that such an interpretation was open to serious
criticism. International law, however, is not merely the product of
agreement between or among states. It is also the product of cus-
tom. This is evidenced by the practice of states, the general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations, and the doctrines
developed by the most recognized legal scholars. At Nuremberg
the issue was not whether some international legal sources had
reached a certain level of development, but whether these sources
had enough specific definitional content to derive from them the
existence of a binding legal duty the violation of which would con-
stitute a punishable offense. Furthermore, there was the question
of whether these legal proscriptions met the tests of specificity em-
bodied in the maxims nullapoena sine lege and nullum crimen sine
lege, and the prohibition against expostfacto crimes. Indeed, it is
a principle generally recognized in criminal law that crimes must be
clearly defined and that sanctions must be specified before one can
be held responsible for committing a proscribed act.9" Some of the
acts with which the defendants were charged in counts three and
four were clearly in violation of the municipal law in effect where
these acts were committed,91 but they were not violative of interna-
87. See Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 405
(1948).
88. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 253.
89. Id. at 254.
90. M. C. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 30-32, 50-58 (1978). See also dis-
cussion on the Eichmann trial, infra notes 210-227 and Appendix F infra, p. 292.
91. This would apply to war crimes and crimes against humanity which were alleged in
the indictment to be in violation of "internal penal laws." See I INDICTMENT, supra note 47,
at 43, 65. It would not apply to planning or waging a war of aggression which was stated in
Vol. 9
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tional law, at least not without substantial extrapolation. Further-
more, other acts held to be criminal were not criminal under
municipal law at that time. Both types of acts, however, were made
applicable in international law and punishable under it.
The view that the Charter represented the retroactive applica-
tion of law can be illustrated by the charges contained in counts one
and two of the indictment, that is, the charge of planning and wag-
ing a war of aggression. The defendants were charged with violat-
ing various treaties entered into by Germany which required, for
example, the pacific settlement of disputes, non-aggression, respect
of neutrality, and so forth.92 Chief among these was the Kellogg-
Briand Pact93 (Pact of Paris) which "condemn[ed] recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies,"94 and "renounce[d]
. . .war as an instrument of national policy. . . ."' There is no
question that the parties to the Pact of Paris declared and agreed not
to resort to war, but did this contract create criminal liability for
those who broke the Pact?9 6 In other words, did the perpetrators of
aggressive war commit merely an unlawful act or a criminal act as
well?
The Pact of Paris contained no sanctions and designated no
tribunal to try its violators. Therefore, according to general princi-
ples of criminal law, it did not establish aggression as an interna-
tional crime. The Tribunal noted, however, that "international law
is not the product of an international legislature, and that such
agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general principles
of law and not with administrative matters of procedure."97 The
the indictment to be "in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances." Id. at
29.
92. See I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 84-92; see also Appendix C infra, p. 279.
93. Kellogg-Briand Pact, done Aug. 27, 1928,46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57
[hereinafter cited as Kellogg-Briand Pact], reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 171 (Supp. 1928)
(official documents).
94. I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 89.
95. Id.
96. The Tribunal explicitly rejected the notion that the only subjects of international
law are states and that those individuals who broke the peace were not publishable.
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as
upon States has long been recognized . . . .Crimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.
I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223. It was nonetheless argued by critics of the judgment that
the contractual obligation created by the Kellogg-Briand Pact in no way established that
violators of the Pact would be subject to criminal penalties. See Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial
Against the Major War Criminals and International Law, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 223, 237-38
(1949).
97. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 221.
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judges found that "the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument
of national policy necessarily involve[d] the proposition that such a
war [was] illegal in international law, and that those who plan[ned]
and wage[d] such a war .. .committ[ed] a crime in so doing."98
Thus, the failure to specify an act as criminal in an international
treaty was not deemed fatal to the recognition of certain acts as
being internationally criminal. The judges in that context stated:
"Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and define
for more accurate reference the principles of law already ex-
isting."99 As support for its interpretation of the Pact of Paris, the
Tribunal also cited various resolutions and unratified treaties which
referred to wars of aggression as an international crime."°° Critics
of this evidence indicate that such resolutions by international bod-
ies and unratified treaties have no binding legal effect. 0 ' The con-
ffict between the views of the Tribunal and those of its critics
regarding the issue of ex post facto application of the law stems
from differing views as to the sources and functions of international
law. If the source of international law relied upon is a treaty, then
that which has not been agreed upon by the parties does not bind
them. Similarly, if acquiescence in a general custom is not evi-
denced by consistent practice, then that particular custom is not
part of international law. Basically, this is the positivistic perspec-
tive employed by critics of the Nuremberg trial. On the other hand,
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,"'1 2
which are a source of international law, may be binding upon states
even in the absence of explicit agreement or specific definitional
content. Furthermore, if it is accepted that international law "is not
static, but by continual adaptation .. . follows the needs of a
changing world,"'0 3 then Justice Jackson was correct when he said:
"[E]very custom has its origin in some single act. . . .Unless we
are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for international
law, we cannot deny that our own day has the right to institute
customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become
98. Id. at 220.
99. Id. at 221.
100. See, e.g., the Geneva Protocol of 1924, Resolution of the Fifth Assembly of the
League of Nations, LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUB. A. 135 (Apr. 1925). See I JUDGMENT, supra
note 47, at 221-22.
101. See Ehard, supra note 96.
102. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38(I)(c), [19701 U.N.Y.B.
1013.
103. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 221.
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sources of newer and strengthened international law.'
The argument that the prosecutors were engaging in retroac-
tive application of the law by prosecuting the defendants for plan-
ning and waging an aggressive war was not persuasive when
applied to the charge of war crimes. The crimes defined in article 6
(b) of the Charter, in the view of the Tribunal, were "covered by
articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907 .. .
[and] that violations of these provisions constituted crimes for
which the guilty individuals were punishable, is too well settled to
admit of argument."° 5 Furthermore, the practice of the victorious
nation punishing, not to mention trying, the vanquished for the
commission of war crimes, has precedent. Thus, establishing a spe-
cial tribunal to administer punishment in accordance with a legal
process, in the opinion of the Allies' judges, did "what any one of
them might have done singly."'" The absence of specific sanctions
in the Hague Regulations was explained by the absence of an inter-
national legislature or a permanent international tribunal with jur-
isdiction to try international crimes. However, this weakness
should not stifle the opportunity to advance international law and
give it a more specific definitional and enforcement content. The
major innovation of the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg, as far as the charge of war crimes is concerned, was not the
creation of offenses which previously had not existed or lacked defi-
nitional or enforcement content, but the fact that the trial was con-
ducted internationally rather than by individual states. °7 The
argument that "crimes against humanity" violated the principles of
ex post facto, nullum crimen sine lege, and nullapoena sine lege was
technically correct. At that time, this crime had not become a rec-
ognized international crime. This is particularly true because the
efforts to include this type of conduct in the post-World War I
peace treaties were unsuccessful. In addition, crimes against hu-
manity were thought of in the context of the law of war and not the
law of peace as that distinction was meaningful at the time. The
notion of the protection of human rights outside the context of war
was not recognized until much after the end of World War II. This
104. II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 47, at 147.
105. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 253. The prosecution of German war criminals after
the First World War was entrusted to German courts which convicted only a handful of
offenders who were very. tightly punished. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 42-51.
106. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 218.
107. At the time of the trial, 17 nations other than the signatories had adhered to the
London Agreement and Charter.
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explains the ambivalence with which the crime was approached at
Nuremberg when it was sought to be extended beyond its war re-
lated context. The opposition to an expanded meaning of that
crime was manifested in the position of the United States and Ja-
pan after World War I, who objected to the inclusion of a separate
crime called "crime against the laws of humanity" in the Treaty of
Versailles since there was very little if any recognition of this of-
fense in conventional or customary international law. At that time
it was not even considered to be a part of the general principles of
international law. Prior prosecution of war criminals did not in-
clude crimes against the laws of humanity as this term was under-
stood in 1919, nor crimes against humanity as it was called in 1945.
Therefore, the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the London
Charter as a recognized international crime was an innovation in
international law. It was in the words of Justice Jackson the "in-
stitut[ion] [of] customs . . . that [would] themselves become
sources of a newer and strengthened international law." 0 8 Never-
theless, the difficulty in sorting out war crimes and crimes against
humanity persisted, and the Nuremberg judgment added more con-
fusion than clarity to that new concept. The court's approach was
that because most acts alleged to be crimes against humanity were
also war crimes, they were clearly violative of the generally ac-
cepted laws and customs of war. There is, therefore, little practical
significance to the fact that crimes against humanity were defined
as separate, technical offenses. Nevertheless, these crimes did
cover situations such as the killing of Germans by Germans in Ger-
man territory. Such acts were not war crimes; they were not related
to the War (World War II) and were wholly within the jurisdiction
of Germany. The indictment defined crimes against humanity as
"[those acts] committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war. . . whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.""° Therefore, the threshold is-
sue posed by the prosecution of such offenses committed in Ger-
many against German nationals before the war began was whether
international law could penetrate the domestic law of a nation. The
language of the Charter clearly implied that international law was
in some respect supreme to municipal law.
The question of the supremacy of international law presents
serious questions affecting national sovereignty and intervention in
108. JACKSON, supra note 72, at 14.
109. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
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the internal affairs of nations. "0 Surely there is a certain interpene-
tration of international and municipal law, but to assume that the
jealously guarded concept of sovereignty has been by-passed is self-
deluding. Nations are still very leery of supranational law and its
effect upon their own municipal systems.
The framers of the Charter and the judges of the Tribunal
were undoubtedly aware of the sensitive nature of inquiring into
the domestic affairs of a nation and the precedent this would estab-
lish. This is why the Charter provided that crimes against human-
ity could only be committed "in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," I that is, crimes
against peace or war crimes. This also explains why there was am-
biguity surrounding the separate nature of the crime. The tribunal
always tried to link crimes against humanity to war crimes and to
crimes against peace while at the same time underscoring their sep-
arateness. Crimes against humanity can best be described, there-
fore, as a separate but interdependent crime. The consequences of
that approach meant that many crimes committed by the Nazi re-
gime against German Jews before the war were deemed outside the
purview of the Charter and the Tribunal's jurisdiction. This meant
that such crimes went unpunished at Nuremberg.
112
Indeed, while article 6(c) provided that crimes against human-
ity could be committed before or during the war - a step beyond
the recommendation of the Committee of Fifteen after World War
I - a connection still had to be established between those crimes
and the plans for aggressive war. That necessary "connection" pre-
cluded the punishment of individuals who committed acts deemed
crimes against humanity because they were unrelated to war or to
the initiation of war. The prosecutors attempted to establish the
necessary connection, but the Tribunal was of the opinion that as
"revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not
been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in
connection with (other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal)."' 13
Thus, the proposition implicit in the Charter - that interna-
tional law is capable of penetrating municipal law outside the con-
text of war - was once more limited by the Tribunal's opinion,
110. See discussion on the Genocide Convention, infra notes 255-277.
111. Charter, supra note 44, art. 6(c).
112. Since Nuremberg, however, the Federal Republic of Germany has vigorously prose-
cuted Nazis who committed such crimes.
113. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 254.
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which in that respect properly reflected the existing state of interna-
tional law. The debate concerning the proper relationship between
municipal and international law persisted after the War and contin-
ues today.
In addition to the above considerations - whether the defend-
ants were subject to international law and whether the law with
which they were charged with violating was properly applied - a
question also emerged concerning whether these defendants would
benefit from certain defenses, namely: (1) were these acts immune
from prosecution because they were acts of state; and (2) were these
acts, if committed pursuant to orders of superiors, beyond punish-
ment?"14 The Charter answered these questions emphatically in the
negative, as did the Tribunal in its judgment when it stated that
"[i]ndividuals have international duties which transcend the na-
tional obligations or obedience imposed by the individual state."' 5
The question of whether the sovereignty of a state could shield
a person acting on behalf of the state was considered in 1919 by the
Committee of Fifteen when the Kaiser's responsibility was at issue.
It was the Committee's opinion that to immunize the person from
prosecution would "involve [establishing] the principle that the
greatest outrages against the laws and customs of war and the laws
of humanity, if proved against him [a sovereign], could in no cir-
cumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the con-
science of civilized manhood.""' 6 Thus, in 1919, the Kaiser was
formally charged with responsibility "for a supreme offense against
international morality and the security of treaties.""' 7 The Kaiser
was not deemed to be protected by his status as head of state but
neither was he charged with violating international criminal law.
Consequently, when the Kaiser sought refuge in the Netherlands,
that country refused to extradite him on the grounds that he had
been charged, in their view, with a political offense for which extra-
114. These questions centered around articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, which stated:
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or respon-
sible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them
from responsibility.
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government
or of a Superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
115. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223.
116. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 264. The United States and Japanese members dis-
sented.
117. See Versailles Treaty, supra note 32, art. 227(1). And, in 1945, some of the Nazi
leaders were charged with a similar international crime, namely, the "crime against peace."
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dition could be denied." 8 The Nazi leaders, on the other hand,
were charged with having committed offenses which constituted in-
ternational crimes, and the failure to abide by treaties was not an
offense against the security of treaties but a crime against peace.
The fact that the violation of treaties was an act of state was
deemed a valid defense for the individuals charged with that viola-
tion. In this context, Justice Jackson stated:
[The] principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as logi-
cal one if [i]nternational [liaw is to render real help to the main-
tenance of peace. An [i]nternational [flaw which operates only
on states can be enforced only by war because the most practica-
ble method of coercing a state is warfare.' 
9
The Tribunal sealed the fate of the act of state defense by stat-
ing that "[h]e who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in
authorizing action moves outside its competence under interna-
tional law." 2 ° This conclusion left only one defense to the defend-
ants, namely, that they acted in obedience to superior orders.
Article 8 of the Charter, however, expressly rejected this defense.
The defendants, then, could only argue that they were deprived of a
valid legal defense by an ex post facto application of the law.
The defense argued that an officer was in no position to deter-
mine the legality of or justification for war especially when the defi-
nition of "aggression" was in dispute.' 21 However, that argument
failed in respect to determining the criminal nature of orders con-
stituting war crimes, or such crimes against humanity as the inten-
tional spreading of typhus disease, 22 forced sterilization, 123 and
mass executions of civilian populations.
While the United States and British military regulations in
force prior to World War II indicated that one obeying superior
orders was not punishable as a criminal, 124 these regulations were
not part of the international law. Indeed, they were somewhat in-
consistent with the general principles of American criminal law
which contained precedents for the proposition that obedience to
118. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 419-20.
119. II PROCEEDINGS, supra note 47, at 150.
120. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223.
121. See Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENSE OF 'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 138-39 (1965); see also Vogler, The Defense of 'Superior Orders' in Interna-
tional Criminal Law, in I BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 25, at 619.
122. See I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 48.
123. See id. at 45-46.
124. See DINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 46-48.
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superior orders was not recognized as a defense.' 25
The Tribunal was of the opinion that article 8 was not an ex
post/acto formulation of a novel principle of law. It was the Tribu-
nal's belief that "[t]he provisions of [article 8 were] in conformity
with the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or
torture in violation of the international law of war has never been
recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality ... ." The Tri-
bunal relied on the Llandovery Castle Case,12 7 a war crime trial
held in Leipzig after World War I which considered the plea of
"obedience to superior orders." The judgment of the German court
trying the case was that
subordinates ... are under no obligation to question the order
of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But
no such confidence can be held to exist if such an order is univer-
sally known to everybody, including the accused, to be without
any doubt whatever against the law.'
28
There were various formulations open to the framers of the
Charter 29 for the rejection of "obedience to superior orders" as an
absolute defense, such as: personal knowledge, according to which
liability attaches only if a subjective knowledge of illegality is es-
tablished;'3 ° and absolute liability, wherein subjective knowledge is
irrelevant. The framers chose the formulation that obedience to su-
perior orders was not an absolute defense but could be considered
only in mitigation of punishment.' 3 ' This position was largely in
conformity with international law even at that time.
Preclusion under article 8 of the "obedience to superior or-
ders" defense led the defense to attempt a distinction between ordi-
nary orders, which would be covered by article 8, and orders of the
Fuihrer, which would not be included within the meaning of that
article. The argument, in essence, was that the Nazi regime was
governed by the tirhrerprinzip, according to which "each Ftihrer
(leader) ha[d] the right to govern, administer or decree, subject to
no control of any kind and at his complete discretion, subject only
125. Id. at 48.
126. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 224.
127. 2 Ann. Dig. 436 (Reichsgericht 1921).
128. Id. at 437. See also DINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 15.
129. See DINSTEIN, supra note 121, at 104-19.
130. Id. Dinstein correctly suggests that the manifest illegality doctrine is part of the
personal knowledge formulation. In other words, the manifest illegality of an order creates a
presumption of knowledge on the part of the accused and must be rebutted.
131. Charter, supra note 44, art. 8; see also Appendix D infra, p. 286.
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to the orders he received from above."' 32 The ordinary leaders,
then, were subject to the directions of the highest Fthrer, Hitler,
and there "was no contradicting the Fuhrer's orders."' 133 Of course,
the inability to disobey orders according to the Nazi law was
deemed irrelevant under international law which imposes duties
"transcending obligations imposed by the State."' 134  The
Fthrerprinzoi, in the view of the Tribunal, could not be accorded a
position of recognition among the law of nations.
They are not deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them,
if they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned to
their tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from responsibil-
ity for their acts. The relation of leader and follower does not
preclude responsibility here any more than it does in the com-
parable tyranny of organized domestic crime.
135
Thus, some of the Nuremberg problems were properly treated
while others were given cursory treatment. The desire was to ad-
vance international criminal law, and to punish those whose crimes
proved to be unprecedented in the history of humankind because of
the driving forces behind the Tribunal's judgments. Indeed, Nu-
remberg was not set up as an international moot court to make de-
cisions concerning theoretical problems. Rather, it was set up to
accomplish a minimum of three things: (1) to express the moral
outrage of the world community; (2) to resort to the rule of law to
prosecute and punish those who had violated the law; and (3) to set
an example and a precedent which might serve as a deterrent for
such violative conduct.
5. The Formulation of the "'Nuremberg Princioles. " The signifi-
cance of the Nuremberg precedent is that "[it] establish[ed] . . .
international human duties transcending both national obligations
under municipal law and official orders of domestic authorities
[and] . . . inflict[ed] the highest penalty on the civil rulers and mili-
tary leaders of a 'criminal' state [which] amounted to a revolution
in the law."' 36 In formulating a theory of state sovereignty, early
writers and philosophers based their conclusions upon observable
facts, 13 7 rather than on "supposedly eternal principles concerning
132. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 176.
133. I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 47, at 484.
134. I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 223.
135. Id. at 226.
136. P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: II GENOCIDE 147 (1959).
137. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 7-16 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
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the nature of states as such."' 3 8 Similarly, the framers of the
London Charter formulated principles of law which could accom-
modate the horrendous events which had occurred during the War.
In light of these crimes, international law could not maintain that
its only proper subjects were fictional entities called "states."
Rather, individuals had to be held responsible for violations of in-
ternational law. To paraphrase Justice Jackson, such crimes are
not committed by abstract legal entitites but rather by individuals
whose actions are claimed to be done under the umbrella of state
legitimacy. Their accountability before the international commu-
nity thus strips their action of its purported legitimacy and makes
them liable to punishment by national or international action.
Only by means of such a concept of "individual responsibility" can
a credible deterrent be established which hopefully will prevent
similar future occurrences. The frequent human depredations
which have occurred since World War II and which continue to go
unpunished, demonstrate that the concept of individual responsi-
bility unfortunately has not been adequately established as a deter-
rent. The fact that only the vanquished, and not the victors -
whose actions in some instances also violated the law of war -
were judged by a law of universal applicability would inevitably
give rise to charges of "victors' vengenance." Nevertheless, the
London Charter and the Nuremberg trial represent a substantial
step in the growth of international criminal law. They laid the
foundation for subsequent efforts to recognize and protect human
rights in time of war and in time of peace. More specifically, ag-
gressive war expressly became an international crime, and in 1972
the United Nations finally reached a definition of aggression. 139 In
addition, in 1949, four new Geneva Conventions on the regulation
of armed conflicts and the protection of human rights emerged." 4
138. Id. at 8.
139. Bassiouni, A Definition ofAggression in International Law- The Crime .4gainst Peace,
in I BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 25, at 159-79; see generally 1 & 2 B. FERENCZ, DEFINI-
TION OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1974).
140. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Prisoners of
War Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
cited as Protection of Civilians Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No, 3362,75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as Wounded and Sick Con-
vention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Wounded at Sea Convention].
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However, in the absence of an international forum with jurisdiction
to try such offenses, nations will undoubtedly continue to resort to
political rather than legal solutions to deal with aggression - war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of human
rights. This means that retribution, if it is to occur at all, is likely
only in the case of an unconditional surrender by a party to a con-
flict and if the victor is willing and able to carry out a scheme of
prosecution and punishment. In light of the fact that at least two
conflicts have taken place since 1945 - Biafra and Bangladesh -
which should have, but did not, give rise to international prosecu-
tion, the likelihood of a Nuremberg reoccurrence is remote.
In the prosecution of war crimes, Nuremberg was unique in
only one respect, namely, the international character of the Tribu-
nal. However, the inclusion of "crimes against humanity" in both
the Charter and the indictment represented a significant, though
cautious, advance in international criminal law. Although the ex-
act scope of "crimes against humanity" is unclear, it is certain that
it was intended to include offenses committed by a state against
civilians, including its own nationals, during the preparation and
the waging of war. It did not, however, encompass those same acts
during peacetime. Indeed, it was not until the 1948 Genocide Con-
vention 14 1 that this lacunae was covered. The London Charter and
the Nuremberg judgment unquestionably broadened the meaning
of crimes against humanity, even though the latter encompassed
offenses which were, for the most part, already covered by the laws
and customs of war. The Charter and the Nuremberg judgment
also included within the meaning of crimes against humanity acts
not necessarily constituting physical mistreatment. By expressly
stating that crimes against humanity could be committed without
regard to an existing state of war - even with the qualification that
they be committed in the execution of or in connection with war
crimes or crimes against peace - they went beyond the wildest ex-
pectations of the World War I Committee of Fifteen. This qualifi-
cation, however, effectively limited the scope of the offense.
The Tribunal did find that crimes against humanity actually
were committed prior to the War; the judgment against defendant
Neurath is illustrative of this fact. His offenses under counts three
and four were categorized as "Criminal Activity in Czechoslova-
kia," ' some of which occurred before the War. However, since
141. See note 255 infra.
142. See I JUDGMENT, supra note 47, at 334.
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the offenses were committed in connection with crimes against
peace, that is, the takeover of Czechoslovakia, they were considered
proper subjects of prosecution under the Charter. 4 3 Thus, it was
not the "nature" of the act that was determinative of its punishab-
lility but rather the "circumstances" under which it was commit-
ted, 144 surely an artificial criterion.
The judgment of acquittal of defendant Streicher further il-
luminates the curious way in which crimes against humanity were
defined. The reasoning supportive of the acquittal was that since
the program of extermination of the Jews was initiated before the
War, and hence already in progress, Streicher committed no crime
connected with the War. Thus, one may ponder why incitement to
commit crimes against humanity, when connected with war, is
shocking to the conscience of humankind; but, when such incite-
ment occurs during the formative years of the policy that engen-
dered such crimes, it is not considered morally shocking.' 45 The
persecution of the Jews in Germany before the War is in no way
less criminal than the execution of that policy of extermination dur-
ing the War. It is all a part of the same continuum and the instiga-
tor of the former is no less responsible than the executor of the
latter, and vice versa.
Nevertheless, article 6(c) of the Charter was limited to offenses
directly related to war. This limitation was recognized by one au-
thor shortly after the war, who noted:
The crime against humanity, as defined in the London Charter,
is not ... the cornerstone of a system of international criminal
law equally applicable in times of war and peace .... [I]t is
a kind of by-product of war, applicable only in time of war
or in connection with war .... It serves to cover cases not cov-
ered by norms forming part of the traditional laws and customs
of war. "
It should be noted, however, that the prosecution of war
criminals and of persons accused of committing crimes against hu-
manity was not confined to the Nuremberg trial. Many trials were
held in the Allied occupation zones pursuant to the authority of
143. Id. at 302.
144. Id. at 304.
145. Arguably, according to the latest constitutional test of when speech urging violence
falls outside the protection of the first amendment, Rosenberg's "incitement" would be pro-
tected speech. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) which holds that mere advo-
cacy of the propriety or necessity for use of force is protected. Only when the speech is
aimed at inciting and is likely to incite the act advocated may the individual be punished.
146. Schwelb, supra note 57, at 206.
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Control Council Order No. 10, the purpose of which was to "estab-
lish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war
criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with
by the . . . Tribunal .. .. "47 Many defendants in these trials
were convicted and punished.
Crimes against humanity were defined by the Control Council
as "[altrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popu-
lation, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds,
whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country
where perpetrated."' 48 The language of article 6(c) of the Charter
limiting crimes against humanity to crimes committed in execution
of or in connection with the war was not included in the Control
Council order. The deletion provides further evidence of the cau-
tion with which the framers of the Charter proceeded when exam-
ining the internal affairs of a state and applying international law
thereto. It has been observed by a noted scholar that
[t]he difference between the Charter and [Control Council Or-
der] No. 10 probably reflects the difference both in the constitu-
tional nature of the two documents and in the standing of the
tribunals called upon to administer the law. . . . [Tihe Interna-
tional Military Tribunal [was], in addition to being an occupa-
tion court for Germany, also - to a certain extent - an
international judicial organ administering international law, and
therefore, its jurisdiction in domestic matters of Germany [was]
cautiously circumscribed. The Allies and German courts, ...
administered primarily local (municipal) law, which, of course,
includes provisions emanating from the occupation authori-
ties. 1
49
After Nuremberg, the United Nations, during its formative
years, dealt with the issues raised by the Nuremberg proceedings
and sought to define the significance of this event. Indeed, the
United Nations Organization, which declares maintaining peace
and security 5 ° and promoting respect for human rights 5 ' among
its purposes, responded to the challenge provided by the London
Charter and the Nuremberg judgment. The challenge was to de-
velop a body of international criminal law that could be applied
147. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 12.
148. Ciiedin Schwelb, supra note 57, at 217.
149. Id. at 218.
150. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1, 11970] U.N.Y.B. 1001.
151. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
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during wartime as well as during peacetime so that the Nuremberg
difficulties could be averted in the future. As a result, the first ses-
sion of the General Assembly indicated its concern with that ques-
tion in three resolutions which set forth the framework and the
future direction of the international scheme for the protection of
human rights.
The General Assembly resolved that a committee be estab-
lished to study "the methods by which the General Assembly
should encourage the progressive development of international law
and its eventual codification."' 52 Taking note of the London
Agreement and Charter, the General Assembly "affirm[ed] the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nu-
remberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."' 53 The Com-
mittee on the Codification of International Law was directed "to
treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the formulation,
in the context of a general codification of offenses against the peace
and security of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, of
the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the judgment of the Tribunal."' 54 Finally, the General As-
sembly unanimously resolved that "genocide is a crime under inter-
national law, which the civilized world condemns, and for the
commission of which principles and accomplices ...are punish-
able."' 55 The expeditious response represented by the resolutions
of December 11, 1946 was not to become, in all cases, characteristic
of the world community's attitudes toward the experiences of
World War II and its aftermath.
The Principles of Nuremberg, formulated by the International
Law Commission (ILC) and adopted by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1950 are:
Principle I
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under
international law is responsible therefor and liable to punish-
ment.
Princple II
The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act
which constitutes a crime under international law does not re-
lieve the person who committed the act from responsibility
under international law.
152. G.A. Res. 94(1), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 187 (1946).
153. G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 188 (1946).
154. Id.
155. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64, at 189 (1946).
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Principle III
The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a
crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsi-
ble Government official does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law.
Princple IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Govern-
ment or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact pos-
sible to him.
Principle V
Any person charged with a crime under international law has the
right to a fair trial on the facts and law.
Princile VI
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law:
(a) Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of interna-
tional treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned
under (i).
(b) War Crimes:
Violations of the laws and customs of war which in-
clude, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave-labor or for any other purpose of
civilian populations of or in occupied territory, mur-
der or ill-treatment of prisoners of war of [sic] persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military neces-
sity.
(c) Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and
other inhuman acts done against any civilian popula-
tion, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions
are carried on in execution of or in connection with any
crime against peace or any war crime.
Principle VII
Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is
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a crime under international law.' 56
With this formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, the argu-
ments concerning the existence of internationally enforceable pro-
scriptions which were raised at the time would now be obviated in
the future. Three questions, however, were not covered by this for-
mulation; first, the creation of a permanent international criminal
court; second, the elaboration of a permanent international crimi-
nal code; and third, the applicability in time of the Nuremberg
Principles.
The United Nations addressed the first question in the same
year it formulated the Nuremberg Principles, and the ILC prepared
a Draft Code for an International Criminal Court. The General
Assembly returned the Draft Code to the ILC for further study, and
in 1953 a detailed Code was formally submitted to the General As-
sembly for its adoption. However, the Code was tabled on the basis
that the General Assembly was unwilling to set up an international
criminal court before it had elaborated a code of international
crimes which the court could apply.
One conclusion can be drawn from the General Assembly's
mandates; namely, that it implicitly recognized the legal signifi-
cance of the Nuremberg Principles which it had adopted in 1950 as
nonenforceable proscriptions to serve as a basis in principle for the
formulation of specific proscriptions to be embodied in a future in-
ternational criminal code.
157
The second question, the formulation of an international crim-
inal code, was addressed by the ILC which submitted to the Gen-
eral Assembly in 1954 the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace
and Security of Mankind.'58 The General Assembly, noting that
the proposed Code included the "crime against peace" which, in its
view, lacked definitional content because the General Assembly
had not yet defined "aggression," tabled the Code until a definition
of "aggression" could be established.' 9 It is now once more before
the General Assembly for consideration in 1980.
The third question, the applicability in time of the Nuremberg
156. See G.A. Res. 488(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 77, U.N. Doc. A/775 (1950).
Report of the ILC, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12), pt. iii, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted
in 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 126 (Supp. 1950) (official documents).
157. This project is now being conducted under the direction of this author to be com-
pleted in 1978 and submitted to the United Nations.
158. See note 278 infra.
159. The United Nations definition of aggression emerged in 1972. See I BASSIOUNI &
NANDA, supra note 25, at 159-79; FERENCZ, supra note 139.
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Principles, did not become apparent until the mid- 1960's when the
Federal Republic of Germany's statute of limitations on the crime
of murder was about to expire. The Federal Republic of Germany,
like most countries, has a statute of limitations which bars prosecu-
tion of offenses after a specified period of time. The period of time
for murder, the highest offense in Germany's criminal code, is
twenty-five years. This meant that by 1970 any person who had
committed murder prior to 1945 would not be subject to prosecu-
tion in Germany. Other countries could prosecute these offenders
on the universality theory of jurisdiction because such crimes are
international crimes, but for practical reasons it would be difficult
to prosecute outside Germany. Furthermore, most countries also
have a similar statute of limitations.
In response to this problem, and prompted by concerned per-
sons and groups - particularly, the International Association of
Penal Law - the United Nations proposed an international con-
vention the object of which was to suspend any statute of limita-
tions for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Convention
on the Nonapplicability of Statutes of Limitations to War Crimes
Against Humanity"6 is perhaps the most tangible result of the Nu-
remberg Principles. If nothing else its message reveals the world
community's refusal to condone morally these acts only because the
statute of limitations has lapsed without the apprehension and trial
of the perpetrators. Indeed, justice cannot hinge on the ability of
those who evade it.
In retrospect, it can be concluded that the Nuremberg Princi-
ples adopted by the General Assembly in 1950 are part of the gen-
eral principles of international law and, as such, constitute one of
the sources of international law as stated in article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice. In addition, these Principles
are the basis for the elaboration of an international criminal code
and the creation of an international criminal court even though
both have yet to become legal realities. Nevertheless, it is assumed
- with the 1972 definition of aggression - that there is no longer a
valid legal impediment to the adoption of a substantive interna-
tional criminal code and the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court.
6. The Impact of World War II "Crimes Against Humanity"
on the Regulation of Armed Conflicts and the Protection of
160. See Appendix E infra, p. 290.
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Civilians.6 ' When the extent of World War II's horrors became
known, it was clear that the War had produced more harm to civil-
ians than to combattants. The ratio of civilian to military casualties
is estimated to be fifty to one. Consequently, it became incumbent
upon the world community to elaborate proscriptions capable of
protecting civilians within the context of war. The Geneva Con-
ventions of 1864 and 1929162 were deficient in that regard; however,
the efforts of the International Commission of the Red Cross
culminated in the Four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,163
which sought to ameliorate this situation. It was actually the exper-
ience of World War II which brought about the required detailed
regulation which was lacking in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conven-
tions. It was that insufficiency which made it difficult at Nurem-
berg to offer a substantive definitional content to crimes against
humanity. The Geneva Conventions have endeavored, therefore,
to be specific in that respect. The Conventions' proscriptions are
clearly responsive to the type of acts committed during World
War II. The Fourth Geneva Convention - the Civilians Conven-
tion - deals with the protection of civilians and prohibits inter alia
those acts which were deemed crimes against humanity at Nurem-
berg. It deals, however, only with war-time situations.
The Civilians Convention contains 159 articles.' 64 It is a state-
ment of fundamental and detailed rights for civilians in time of
war. The Convention attempts to extend to civilians those rights
and protections that have been established for prisoners of war and
the sick and wounded of the armed forces.
As in each of the four Conventions, it is important at the outset
to determine the class of persons protected by the Convention. In
this instance, that class is broad and covers most persons who are in
enemy hands. The Convention applies to the whole population of
countries in conflict, regardless of race, nationality, religion, or po-
161. This section is drawn from I BASSlOUNI & NANDA, supra note 25, at 392-99.
162. See note 68 supra.
163. See note 140 supra.
164. The Convention is divided into four parts and is completed by three annexes. Parts
I and IV contain those articles which are common to all four Conventions. Part II, compris-
ing articles 13 through 26, deals with the general protection of civilians against certain conse-
quences of war. Part III, which consists of articles 27 through 141, is divided into four
sections. Section I contains the provisions relating to the territories of the parties to the
conflict and to occupied territories. Section II governs aliens in the territory of a party to the
conflict. Section III relates to occupied territories. Section IV contains regulations for the
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litical opinion. 165 However, certain exceptions to this broad cover-
age exist that are important in determining whether a "grave
breach"166 of the Convention has occurred. Grave breaches, as de-
fined by the Convention, can only occur in regard to persons or
property protected by the Convention. 67 All nationals of a party
not bound by the Convention are excluded from its coverage, 68 as
are all nationals of a co-belligerent state as long as the state of
which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in
the state in whose hands they are. 169 Also excluded from protection
are all persons protected under any one of the other three Conven-
tions. 170
Those provisions concerning the status and treatment of pro-
tected persons, specifically article 27, carry on the theme of funda-
mental principles of the laws of Geneva. They are entitled to
respect for the human person and the inalienable nature of funda-
mental rights.' 7 ' Honor, family rights, religious convictions and
practices, and their manners and customs are protected against
threats or acts of violence, insult, or public curiosity. 72 Women are
protected against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of inde-
cent assault.' 73 Physical and moral coercion to obtain information
is prohibited, 7 4 as are murder, torture, mutilation, and medical or
scientific experiments not necessary for the health of the person.1
75
Similarly, collective punishments, terrorism, pillage, and reprisals
against protected persons and their property are disallowed. 176 The
Convention clearly states that "[tihe taking of hostages is prohib-
ited." 1
77
165. Civilians Convention, supra note 140, art. 13.
166. A grave breach results from the commission of any of the following acts, if commit-
ted against persons or property protected by the Convention: (1) wilful killing, torture or
inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; (2) causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health; (3) unlawful deportation or transfer; (4) unlawful confinement; (5)
compelling a protected person to serve in the armed forces of a hostile power; (6) wilful
deprivation of the rights of fair and regular trial as proscribed in the Convention; (7) taking
of hostages; and (8) extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by mili-
tary necessity. Id. art. 147.
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 4.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. art. 27.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. art. 31.
175. Id. art. 32.
176. Id. art. 33.
177. Id. art. 34.
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Protected persons may not be used to render certain areas im-
mune from military operations. 178 The Convention expressly sets
forth the responsibility of the state as well as its agents for viola-
tions of the Treaty irrespective of any individual responsibility
which may be incurred. 179 Additionally, protected persons "shall
have every facility for making application to the protecting powers,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red
Cross . . . of the country where they may be, as well as to any
organization that might assist them."'
' 80
The Convention also deals with the status of aliens in the terri-
tory of the enemy belligerent. All aliens who are protected persons
must be allowed to leave the territory at the start of the conflict
unless it is "contrary to national interests."1 8 1 Those who leave are
permitted to take the necessary funds and reasonable quantities of
their effects and personal items,18 2 and these departures must be
carried out in satisfactory conditions as regards safety, hygiene,
sanitation, and food.' 83 There is an additional general imposition
under this section of the Convention of a duty on the belligerent to
treat protected persons humanely. 84
Protected persons who have lost their employment as a result
of the war are to find paid employment, and if they are unable to
support themselves because of security controls or regulations, the
controlling power has the obligation to support them.' 85 They may
be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the
state they are in, and such employment cannot be directly related to
the conduct of military operations.
8 6
If methods of control as indicated in the Convention are
deemed inadequate by the controlling power, the belligerent power
is prohibited from the institution of measures of control more se-
vere than that of assigned residence of internment, 187 the latter be-
ing justified only if the security of the detaining power makes it
absolutely necessary. 188 Such internment is to be reviewed by a
178. Id. art. 28.
179. Id. art. 29.
180. Id. art. 30.
181. Id. art. 35.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. arts. 38 & 39.
185. Id. art. 39.
186. Id. art. 40.
187. Id. art. 41.
188. Id. art. 42.
Vol. 9
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court or administrative board and must continue to be reviewed at
least twice a year; information as to internments must be given to
the protecting power unless the interned persons object.'8 9
The section also provides protection for refugees, who may not
be treated as enemy aliens solely on the basis of dejure nationality
of the enemy state if, in fact, they do not enjoy the protection of any
government.' 90 In addition, transfer of protected persons in the do-
mestic territory of a contracting party to a power which is not a
party to the Convention is prohibited.19' This provision is virtually
identical to article 12 of the Prisoners of War Convention 92 con-
cerning the transfer of protected persons.
The provisions relating to the rights and duties of the occupy-
ing power, and of the protected persons in occupied territory, 193 are
in some respect the most important provisions of the Civilians Con-
vention, for it is in this area that a majority of the crimes against
humanity occurred. The Hague Regulations established rather
general and limited rules for the protection of inhabitants of occu-
pied territory.194 Two world wars proved their grave inadequacies.
It was against this background that these provisions of the Civilians
Convention were drafted. The general principles of these provi-
sions may briefly be referred to here: (1) the occupation is of a lim-
ited and temporary nature; (2) sovereignty is not vested in the
occupant; (3) the prime duty is the establishment of order in the
occupied territory; (4) the existing administration, economy, legal
system, and general life of the occupied community should be sub-
ject only to minimum alteration; and (5) this "minimum alteration"
is to be determined by the restrictions and changes properly im-
posed for the security of the occupant's military and civil adminis-
tration.
One of the most important provisions of this section is that
which prohibits individual or mass transfers and deportation of
protected persons from an occupied territory to that of the occupant
or to any other power, occupied or not, regardless of their
motives. 195 It was this practice of deportation which added years to
the Nazi war effort when Germany's own resources were virtually
189. Id. art. 43.
190. Id. art. 44.
191. Id. art. 45.
192. See note 140 supra.
193. Id. arts. 47 & 48.
194. See Regulations, supra note 50, arts. 42-56.
195. Civilians Convention, supra note 140, art. 49.
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exhausted. This same provision allows the occupant to evacuate
protected persons in the interest of the safety of the population, for
imperative military reasons, or because such areas cannot ade-
quately be supplied.' 96 All such transfers, however, must be hu-
manely conducted and the protecting power must be informed of
them as soon as they have taken place. 197 Conversely, this provi-
sion prohibits the detention of protected persons in danger areas
and prevents the occupying power from moving parts of its own
population into the occupied territory. 98
As far as children in occupied territories are concerned, it is
stipulated that the occupying power will facilitate, with the cooper-
ation of the national and local authorities, the proper working of all
institutions which concern themselves with the care, maintenance,
and education of children.' 99 Moreover, a special information bu-
reau" is responsible for recording the identification of children
whose identification is in doubt as well as any information relating
to their parents or other near relatives.20"
Compulsory service of protected persons in the armed forces of
the occupant is absolutely prohibited and the class of work that the
inhabitants may be forced to do is limited.2" 2 In particular, they
cannot be forced to undertake any work which would require them
to partake in or contribute to military operations.20 3
The Convention appears to have made a significant advance in
the protection of both public and private property. It is provided
that destruction of such property by the occupying power is prohib-
ited "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely neces-
sary by military operations. ' 2°
Judges and public officials are to have their status maintained
even though the occupying power may remove them from their po-
sitions.20 5 If, however, they wish to resign for reasons of con-
science, they may not be coerced into remaining in office.
The Convention further provides detailed provisions for hospi-




199. Id. art. 50.
200. Id. art. 136.
201. Id. art. 50.
202. Id. art. 51.
203. Id.
204. Id. art. 53.
205. Id. art. 54.
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sion of the protecting power.2 °6 It is also provided that the
occupying power must insure "to the fullest extent" the sufficiency
of the food and medical supplies of the population.2 °7 When neces-
sary, after the needs of the population have been considered, the
occupying power may import those supplies required when re-
sources are inadequate within the occupied territory. 28 This sec-
tion appears clearly to transform internment from what previously
may have been a punishment into a safety measure for the public
authorities, with safeguards for the individual.20 9
The fact that a convention exists exclusively for the protection
of civilians is noteworthy; it represents a substantial step in human-
itarian progress. The machinery available within the four comers
of its provisions can provide some humanization of war. Clearly,
the Convention does not cover peacetime situations which pre-
sumably are covered by the law of peace - or, more specifically,
through treaties on the international protection of human rights
and other specialized conventions.
C Post-Nuremberg Developments in the Prosecution of "Crimes
Against Humanity": The Eichmann Trial
Since Nuremberg, many states have prosecuted war criminals
in national or specially constituted tribunals. No state, however,
had tried major war criminals whether at large or dead. Two no-
torious criminals, however, were still sought. They were Martin
Bormann and Adolph Eichmann. Bormann was said to be dead;
Eichmann was known to be alive. The search for Eichmann re-
sulted in his trial in Israel. His trial was the only trial of a major
war criminal to be held outside Germany.
Eichmann was discovered in Argentina where he was kid-
napped by Israelis and brought back to Israel to stand trial under a
1948 Israeli law for crimes committed against the "Jewish peo-
ple." He was charged under international law with crimes
against humanity - as embodied in the Nuremberg Principles -
and with genocide. Specifically, he was charged with: (1) having
participated in the killing of Jews between 1939 and 1945;211 (2)
206. Id. arts. 56-62.
207. Id. art. 55.
208. Id.
209. Id. arts. 79-135.
210. The law under which Eichmann was tried was passed in 1950 by the Knesset and
titled "The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators Law."
211. See Eichmann Trial, Verbatim Transcripts, Indictment, count 1.
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"having placed millions of Jews in living conditions . . . which
were calculated to bring about their physical destruction";2 2 (3)
having enslaved, starved, and deported Jews so as to deprive them
of rights as human beings;213 and (4) having committed other
crimes against humanity.
21 4
Eichmann argued that the Israeli court was without compe-
tence to try the charged offenses. The court held, however, that it
was competent to try them.21 5 Eichmann also argued that the Is-
raeli law - and genocide - with which he was charged were being
applied retroactively. The court found that retroactivity in this case
was just.2 16 In addition, Eichmann advanced the argument that the
improper means by which he was brought before the court de-
prived it of authority to hear the case. This argument was likewise
rejected.217
The court relied on three theories of extraterritorial applica-
tion of laws to justify its subject-matter jurisdiction in the case. The
212. Id. count II.
213. Id.
214. Id. counts 5, 6 & 7.
215. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 24-25 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
216. The court, in its judgment, recognized that Israeli law was being retroactively ap-
plied, see id. at 20, but found that it "ha[d] to give effect to the law of the Knesset, and...
[could] not entertain the contention that the law conflict[ed] with the principles of interna-
tional law." Id. at 25. In other words, the court was not empowered to review legislative
acts. It should be noted that while most legal systems recognize the principle of exposifacto,
it has been maintained that it is not a rule of international law. Moreover, there are signifi-
cant examples of its non-application in municipal law. Id. But see Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, infra note 228, art. 11(2): "No one shall be guilty of any penal offense...
which did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, at the time
when it was committed." A similar provision is found in article 15 of the yet to become
effective International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp (No. 21) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Article 15(2) of this Convention pro-
vides, however, that "Inlothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any
person for any act. . . which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations." Crimes against hu-
manity, with which Eichmann was charged, were found to be in violation of the law of
nations according to the Nuremberg judgment. If the judgment represents the application of
general principles of international law, the Israeli court was correct in holding that Eich-
mann's acts were violative of international law when committed.
217. Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 76 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961). The court
found that under Israeli law the kidnapping did not affect its jurisdiction to hear the case,
and that this view was consistent with the municipal law of other nations. American prece-
dent for example, holding that the use of improper means to bring an individual into the
jurisdiction is irrelevant to the competency of its courts to try the case, was especially relied
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first was the "protected interest theory, ' '2 ' 8 according to which acts
committed outside the territory of a state may properly be brought
before its courts if the acts in question affect significant interests of
the state.2 "9 The second was the "nationality theory" which allows
a state to prosecute a person who has harmed its nationals.220 Both
of these theories should be questioned, however, since Israel did
not exist as a state at the time Eichmann's acts occurred and, hence,
could have had no national interests in the protection of those who
were not its citizens. Israel relied, however, on the theory that it
embodied the "Jewish people" concept in its political existence, and
that this concept allowed Israel to extend its protective jurisdiction
to all Jews wherever located. This theory has no basis in interna-
tional law, particularly in respect to the jurisdictional applications
given to it. However, Israel had another valid basis of jurisdiction.
The district court of Jerusalem appropriately held that "the author-
ity and jurisdiction to try crimes under international law are uni-
versal. ' 221  This is the doctrine of universality of jurisdiction in
cases of international crimes which are "no longer national, but
hostis humanigeneris and as such. . .[may be prosecuted] by any
218. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 50 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961). See
generally INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 47-50.
219. Closely akin to the protected interest theory is the passive personality theory which
allows a state to apply its law extraterritorially to acts affecting the welfare of its nationals,
wherever they may be located. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 46.
The passive personality theory finds its most celebrated application in the case of the S.S.
Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, no. 10. The Lotus, a French ship, collided with a Turkish vessel
near Turkish territorial waters. Turkey claimed jurisdiction under the Turkish Penal Code
to try the French officer in charge. The Code provided that offenses committed outside Tur-
key to the prejudice of the Turkish state or her subjects were prosecutable under Turkish
law.
The Court, in dicta, responded to the French contention that Turkey was without juris-
diction to try the offense, stating:
The territoriality of criminal law is not an absolute principle of international law
and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty. . . .Far from laying down
a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the application of their
laws and the jurisdiction of their country to persons, property and acts outside their
country, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is limited
only in certain cases by prohibitive rules.
Id. at 19-20.
The Lotus was not the basis of the Israeli court's upholding jurisdiction in Eichmann,
however. This was so because The Lotus recognized that a person denying a court's jurisdic-
tion has the burden of proving which rule of international law applies, and the Israeli court,
rather than placing the burden on the defendant, preferred to establish positively Israel's
right to punish. P. PAPADATOS, THE EICHMANN TRIAL 135 (1964).
220. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 50 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
221. Id. at 26.
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State anywhere. 222
As to the charge of genocide, by 1961 that crime was recog-
nized as an international crime by virtue of the Genocide Conven-
tion of 1948. But the crime of genocide for acts committed during
the period 1939-1945 did not exist. Nevertheless, the charges
against Eichmann constituted an international crime in light of the
London Charter and the Nuremberg judgment. Thus, the district
court of Jerusalem was correct in applying the theory of universal
jurisdiction as was the Israeli Supreme Court in upholding the
lower court's decision.223 Thus, the application, in Eichmann's
case, of a universality theory of jurisdiction instead of the preferred
theory of territoriality was valid, but the retroactive application of
the crime of genocide contravened the terms of the Convention
even though "the territorial jurisdiction established by [the Geno-
cide Convention] is only determined as an obligatory minimum
which in no way limits the rights of the signatory states to pun-
ish. '224 In other words, customary law may coexist with conven-
tional obligations of treaties so that the right to punish may be
exercised, notwithstanding the terms of the Genocide Convention,
by any nation "within the framework of international customary
law."-
225
While providing an effective theoretical basis for dealing with
offenders, the recognition of universal jurisdiction to try the crime
of genocide also poses certain problems. One such problem is rep-
resented by the view that
crimes against humanity for the most part are committed by the
state within the framework of its political activity and directed
against its own citizens; ... to submit these crimes to the juris-
diction of a foreign country would constitute a form of interven-
tion in the affairs of the state ... and would allow one state to
interfere with policies applied by another state to its own citi-
zens.2
2 6
Thus the dilemma: intervention in the internal affairs of another
state - which is improper but necessary to bring a person to trial
222. Id citing In re Piracy Jure Gentium, 7 Ann. Dig. 213, 215 (Jud. Comm. of the Privy
Council, Gr. Brit., 1934).
223. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Supreme Court of Israel
1961). It is to be noted, however, that if the crime of genocide is prosecuted in the future
pursuant to the Genocide Convention, see note 255 infra, the preferred theory of jurisdiction
is the territorial one whereby jurisdiction vests in the territory in which the crime occurred
unless there is a competent international criminal court.
224. PAPADATOS, supra note 219, at 50.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 47.
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- or observance of the rule of nonintervention and thus the denial
of justice by freeing an alleged criminal. Of course, states are obli-
gated to prosecute or extradite - aut dedere aut iudicare - but
what if a state fails to do either? The remedies are limited. As one
author noted:
The repression of genocide can be effectively undertaken only by
means of an international system of criminal justice. Interna-
tional legislation of substantive criminal law is doomed to re-
main a dead letter precisely in the most serious and dangerous
cases of governmental crime by the persons in power unless an
international criminal court [can] effectively . . . exercise juris-
diction and administer penal sanctions ....
II. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE LAW OF PEACE
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
228
Shortly after its creation in 1946, the United Nations turned its
attention to the protection of human rights. The first order of busi-
ness of the United Nations and the Human Rights Commission was
to prepare an "international bill of rights. ' 229 The latter was to
"consist of a Declaration of Human Rights, one or more conven-
tions on human rights, and the necessary international measures of
implementation. ' 230 Though the Declaration itself had no binding
legal effect,2 3 1 its legal significance subsequently changed. Since its
adoption, the Declaration has influenced the drafting of constitu-
tions of nations which gained their independence in the 1950's and
early 1960's.232 In 1971, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
2 33
227. DROST, supra note 136, at 201.
228. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71-77 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Human
Rights Declaration], reprintedin BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 106-12 (I. Brownlie
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as BASIC DOCUMENTS]. Various provisions of the Declaration
have been included in conventions, i e., legally effective agreements. For example, equal
protection of the laws is embodied in article 5 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See note 297 infra.
229. The Human Rights Commission was set up under the auspices of the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations "for the promotion of human rights." See U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 68. One of the functions of the Economic and Social Council is to "make recom-
mendations for the purpose of promoting respect for and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all." Id. art. 62.
230. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (U.N. PUBL. E. 73.1.13) (1973).
231. See Lauterpacht, Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 354
(1948); Briggs, Implementation of the Proposed International Covenant on Human Rights, 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 389 (1948).
232. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 230.
233. Advisory Opinion on the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
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indicated that the Declaration may be viewed as binding insofar as
the affirmations contained therein
[h]ave acquired the force of custom through a general practice
accepted as law. . . .One right which must certainly be consid-
ered a pre-existing binding customary norm which the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights codified is the right to equality,
which by common consent has ever since the remotest times
been deemed inherent in human nature.234
The ICJ opinion also held that the provisions of the Declaration
represent "general principles of international law recognized by
civilized nations," and are legally binding because they interpret
,the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and are
applicable to member states as the embodiment of article 55, the
execution of which is required by article 56. " 235
The Declaration recognizes in its preamble the importance of
protecting human rights - so that another holocaust may be
avoided - and states that "disregard and contempt for human
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the con-
science of mankind," and that "it is essential, if man is not to be
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyr-
anny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the
rule of law. .... -"I The basic human rights enumerated in the
Declaration include: the right to life; 237 freedom from slavery;
238
freedom from torture or cruel, inhumane punishment;239 equal pro-
tection of the laws;2' fair trial;24' freedom of assembly;242 and
those limitations on the power of government that are typically
found in a "bill of rights" or a national constitution.243 The Decla-
ration also recognizes nontraditional rights. These rights include,
for example, the right to social security,24 the right to rest and
234. Id. at 76, discussed in INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 159.
235. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 33, at 160. Lauterpacht rejects the view
that the Declaration is binding as an interpretation of principles contained in the United
Nations Charter. See Lauterpacht, supra note 231, at 369. Municipal courts of the United
States have also, generally, rejected the notion that United Nations principles are operative
as self-executing. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 943-47 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SOHN & BUERGENTHAL].
236. Human Rights Declaration, supra note 228, preamble.
237. Id. art. 3.
238. Id. art. 4.
239. Id. art. 5.
240. Id. art. 7.
241. Id. arts. 8, 9, 10 & II.
242. Id. art. 20.
243. 1d. arts. 18 & 19.
244. Id. art. 22.
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leisure,245 the right to an adequate standard of living,246 and the
right to participation in the cultural life of the community.247
The broad language employed by the drafters of the Declara-
tion, as well as the certainty of encountering multiple interpreta-
tions of novel propositions and possible conflicts with municipal
law, 248 are among the reasons that the first efforts of the Human
Rights Commission were directed at a mere "declaration" rather
than a draft convention. The Declaration was adopted without op-
position although eight members abstained.2 49 The prospect that
the Declaration would eventually be reduced to convention form
was not universally applauded. For example, influential groups in
the United States were highly critical of many aspects of the Decla-
ration. The President of the American Bar Association typified the
obstacle that differing political perspectives would place in the de-
velopment of human rights legislation when he criticized articles 22
through 27250 as constituting "an agreement to adopt the 'New
Deal' on an international scale by committing the member nations
to a paternalistic form of government which would attempt to care
for all the daily needs of the citizen, and minimize the incentive for
individual initiative and progress."' 251 Fortunately, this was a lim-
ited perspective and did not receive much support. In addition to
constituting in some respects "general principles of law. . . or rep-
resent[ing] elementary consideration of humanity, ' 252 the effect of
the Declaration is that "it embodies . . . a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and nations .... ,253 The moral and
legal force of the document is open to argument, but if the pro-
nouncement of Nuremberg is that the community of nations places
245. Id. art. 24.
246. Id. art. 25.
247. Id. art. 27.
248. See Lauterpacht, supra note 231, at 362. The Canadians, for example, believed that
article 21 of the Declaration was inconsistent with Canadian law.
249. The abstaining nations were: Byelorussian SSR; Czechoslovakia; Poland; Saudi
Arabia; Ukranian SSR; USSR; Union of South Africa; and Yugoslavia.
250. Articles 22-27 proclaim the individual's right to: (I) the realization of the economic,
social, and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his per-
sonality; (2) a free choice of employment under just and favorable conditions of work; (3)
rest and leisure, including limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay; (4) a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family; (5) free
education, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages; and (6) participate freely in the
cultural life of the community.
251. Holman, " An International Bill of Rights'" Proposals Have Dangerous Implications
for U.S., 34 ABA J. 984, 1080 (1948).
252. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at 106.
253. See Lauterpacht, supra note 231, at 366.
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legal as well as moral duties upon individuals, and if the progress of
law is measured by the development of effective limitations on the
arbitrary exercise of power, then the Declaration was a step for-
ward.254 It symbolizes a shift from a concern for people exclusively
in the context of war to a broader humanitarian concern applicable
in a universal context and at all times.
B. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)
255
A quarter of a century ago, Lemkin said that new conceptions
254. See id. at 370-75.
255. Openedfor signature Dec. 8, 1948,78 U.N.T.S. 277, [19491 Can. T.S. No. 27 (entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention], reprinted in 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1951) (official documents), and in BAsIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at
116-20.
The United States has consistently refused to ratify the Genocide Convention since its
submission to the Senate in 1949. That year the American Bar Association's special
committee on the Convention opposed its ratification. See Report, Peace and Law Through
United Nations, 74 REP. ABA 316 (1949); Resolution of the A.B.A. Section of International
and Comparative Law, Report and Recommendations (1949); see also Finch, The Genocide
Convention, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 732 (1949) whose editorial on the position of the American
Journal ofInternational Law supported the A.B.A. conclusions. For a more recent study, see
Comment, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 683
(1975). The arguments advanced at that time have since been reiterated.
The principal objections to the Convention are: (1) the Convention as drafted is
imprecise in its language and vague to its specific prohibitions particularly in respect to
conduct which is anticipatory; (2) the mental element as described is believed to be
sufficiently imprecise for enforcement in United States courts; (3) the Convention prohibits
"incitement" to Genocide which is believed to violate the first amendment to the
Constitution (freedom of speech), see McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the
Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950); Goldberg & Gardner, Time To Act on the Genocide
Convention, 58 ABA J. 141(1972); (4) all state criminal laws include the prohibitions covered
by the Convention; (5) concurrent jurisdiction over the same crimes creates confusion
between the federal and state courts; (6) the Convention's creation of an international
criminal court is unacceptable because United States citizens would not benefit in that type
of a court from the constitutional safeguards otherwise available to them in United States
courts.
Most of these arguments have, however, been discredited. In substance, the United
States' position is intended to prevent any form of foreign intervention in its domestic affairs.
It is nonetheless valid to argue that the 1948 Convention suffers from imprecise drafting.
The vote on the Convention was 55 votes to 0, with Costa Rica, El Salvador, and the
Union of South Africa absent. See 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 755-56 (1948) for a statement
made before the General Assembly on Dec. 9, 1948, by Ernest A. Gross, Legal Advisor,
Department of State and alternate United States Representative to the General Assembly.
On the background of the Genocide Convention in the United Nations, see M.
WHITEMAN, I DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-20 (1963). See generally Comment,
Genocide. A Commentary on the Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Commentary on the Convention]; Kuhn, The Genocide Convention and State Rights, 43 AM. J.
INT'L L. 498 (1949); McDougal & Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3
VAND. L. REV. 683 (1950).
On May 28, 1951, by a vote of 7 to 5, the International Court of Justice, at the request of
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require new terms. Thus, a new word entered the legal vocabulary
- genocide. It was intended
to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the
destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups
. . . . The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration
of the political and social institutions of culture, language, na-
tional feelings, religions and the economic existence of national
groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health,
dignity, and even lives of the individuals belonging to such
groups.256
The standard of mankind's "common morality" increased with
each tragic advent of human atavism. As more people considered
all wars to be fratricide, and human dignity the most sacred value
of civilization, genocide acquired more meaning to more people.257
At Nuremberg, the distinction was drawn between the murder
of anti-Nazi Germans and German Jews, and anti-Nazi non-
Germans and non-German Jews. The Tribunal concerned itself
with crimes committed in time of war or connected with war, ex-
cluding peacetime atrocities .25  Thus, "crimes against humanity"
were considered to be either "war crimes" or separate crimes "con-
nected to the conduct of war." Nuremberg thus provided a weak
precedent for international individual responsibility with regard to
the General Assembly of November 16, 1950, delivered an advisory opinion on three
questions concerning reservations to the Genocide Convention. Advisory Opinion or
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15.
First, the court declared that a state having made and maintained a reservation which
has been objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention, but not by others, can
be regarded as being a party to the Convention if the reservation is compatible with the
object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, the state cannot be regarded as being a
party.
In reply to the General Assembly's second question concerning the effect of the
reservations with respect to parties objecting to or accepting a reservation, the court held that
if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible
with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving state
is not a party to the Convention. If, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as
being compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that
the reserving state is a party.
Third, the court stated that an objection made by a signatory state which has not yet
ratified the Convention can have legal effect only upon ratification; until that moment, the
objection merely serves as a notice to the other states of the eventual attitude of the signatory
state. Further, an objection made by a state which is entitled to sign or accede, but which has
not yet done so, is without legal effect.
256. R_ LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).
257. Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 147
(1947).
258. OPPENHEIM, supra note 52, at 279.
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non-war-connected crimes. Yet, the world community realized the
need to legislate the prohibition and punishment of mass destruc-
tion of human lives in time of peace, 259 and in 1948 the Genocide
Convention was adopted by the General Assembly.
In 1948, the General Assembly resolved 260 that genocide -
one category of crimes against humanity - constituted a crime
under international law. Like the resolution adopting the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the genocide resolution was not
positive law. However, unlike the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the genocide resolution was embodied into a Treaty ratified
by a sufficient number of states to come into force.26 1 Genocide is
defined by the Convention as follows:
[W]ith intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
262
The Convention provides that "genocide, whether committed
in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law. .... -263 Thus, the Convention, which hopefully will operate
primarily - if not exclusively - in time of peace, took the logical
stride beyond the London Charter and the Nuremberg judgment.
It included, however, within the definition of genocide, "serious
bodily or mental harm to members of a group" in terms equally as
259. This was one of the objectives of the ILC's Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954 which was tabled by the General Assembly.
Johnson, The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security ofaMankind, 4 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 445 (1955). The Draft Code is discussed infra, notes 278-296.
260. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
261. Genocide Convention, supra note 255, art. XIII. The main principles established by
the Convention are: (1) the contracting states are bound to enact the laws needed to give
effect to the provisions of the Convention; specifically, to provide effective penalties; (2)
states undertake to try persons charged with these offenses in their competent national courts;
(3) parties to the Convention agree that the acts listed shall not be considered political
crimes. Therefore, they pledge to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and trea-
ties. Id. arts. V, VI & VII.
262. Genocide Convention, supra note 255, art. II.
263. Id. art. I.
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broad as the terms used to define crimes against humanity at Nu-
remberg.
In addition to the above, the original drafts of the Convention
referred to cultural genocide as "acts aimed at destruction of librar-
ies, museums, schools, historical monuments, and religious edifices,
or the suppression of language or printing media of a particular
group. '' 264 While such a notion is not included in the Convention,
which is limited to offenses committed against the person, aspects
of cultural genocide are within the coverage of other conven-
tions.265
The key phrase in the definition of genocide is "with intent to
destroy in whole or in part. . . a group as such." Thus, genocide
can only be committed when it is established that the accused ex-
hibited the requisite state of mind. Therefore, an attack upon one
or a few members of a disfavored group, which attack is motivated
by the latter's membership in that group, is not genocide unless an
intent to destroy "in whole or inpart. ..the group as such" can be
established. While it is perfectly possible that one could subjec-
tively intend the partial destruction of a group by such an act, it
seems unlikely that one would be charged with genocide. The ap-
parent ability to commit genocide, while not an element of the of-
fense, would apparently determine whether a charge of genocide
would lie. This points up a basic weakness in the Convention.
Jurisdiction under the Convention to try the offense of geno-
cide is proper "in the territory of which the act was committed, or
by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
... 266 The Convention, therefore, adopts the territorial princi-
ple of jurisdiction. In this regard, it must be remembered that the
trial of the German major war criminals was held by an interna-
tional tribunal and not by a municipal tribunal of the territory in
which the war crimes and crimes against humanity were commit-
ted. In other words, the London Charter was not based upon the
territorial theory, but rather upon the universality theory, of juris-
264. Commentary on the Convention, supra note 255, at 1145.
The Nuremberg indictment listed as a war crime "plunder of public and private prop-
erty." I INDICTMENT, supra note 47, at 55. Included in article 55 was the destruction of
cultural monuments and scientific institutions. The Hague Regulations also proscribed the
destruction of institutions devoted to religious worship, arts and sciences, or historical monu-
ments. See Regulations, supra note 50, art. 56.
265. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, infra note 297, art. 5(d) vii-ix.
266. Id. art. VI.
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diction.267 As noted above, the universality theory provides that
certain acts constitute offenses against the world community and, as
such, any tribunal is competent to try them. Thus, a curious para-
dox: crimes against humanity, as defined by the London Charter,
were tried under a universality theory of jurisdiction; yet, under the
Genocide Convention, the universality theory was relegated to an
alternative theory.
The Convention provides that enforcement of its provisions is
to be entrusted to the contracting parties. In accordance with their
respective constitutions, the parties "undertake to enact the neces-
sary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the Convention
and, inparticular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide .. ".."268 The principles of penal responsibility in the
Convention extend to principals and accessories, before and after
the fact as in the case of any common crime, regardless of whether
such individual is a public official, scientist, writer, or anyone who
instigates, plans, prepares, conspires, contributes, or executes the
crime in whole or in part. This responsibility also extends to "pop-
ular spontaneous" acts of masses who may commit such acts as are
prohibited by the Convention.269 As noted above, it seems unlikely
that any individual is capable of committing genocide; the offense
is only likely to be committed under governmental direction. A
government that is intent upon genocide certainly will not allow its
municipal law to be applied against itself. Thus, although genocide
may be considered an international crime, the government officials
responsible are not subject to effective sanctions. The repression of
genocide, then, can be effective only if, in addition to municipal
legislation, an international criminal court can be established with
effective means of exercising its jurisdiction and implementing its
judgments. In addition, the Convention must be supplemented
with collective sanctions. The "collective" aspect of genocide is to
be seen in the protected groups under the Convention. According
to the definition of the crime, the element of "collectivity" is to be
found in the special intent to destroy a particular human group. It
is argued that, fundamentally, genocide is but mass homicide with
a special interest directed toward a special category of people but
ultimately perpetrated on a particular person belonging to such
267. For a discussion of the various theories of jurisdiction, see Bassiouni, Theories of
Jurisdiction and Their Application in Extradition Law and Practice, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 1,
50-57 (1974); BRIERLY, supra note 137, at 299-304.
268. Genocide Convention, supra note 255, art. V.
269. Id arts. III & IV.
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group. The definition of genocide also leads to the conclusion that
genocide amounts to an offense against the fundamental human
rights of the individual.
If there is any dispute between one country and another on the
interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the Convention, the
dispute must be submitted, at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute, to the International Court of Justice.27°
The Convention declares that those guilty of genocide and the
other acts listed shall be punished "whether they are constitution-
ally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals."
This clause makes it impossible for a person to plead immunity
because he was the head of a state or held some other public of-
fice.27 ' In addition, any contracting party may call upon the com-
petent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the related
acts.272
The Convention also envisages trial by an international crimi-
nal court27 3 should one ever come into being. During discussion by
the legal Committee in 1948, the question of an international penal
jurisdiction was carefully considered. Thereafter, the General As-
sembly adopted a resolution 274 which contained three important
provisions. First, the resolution recognized that the international
community would be increasingly in need of an international judi-
cial organ for the trial of crimes under international law. Second,
the resolution invited the ILC to study both the desirability and the
possibility of establishing such an international judicial organ. Fi-
nally, the resolution required the ILC to consider the possibility of
establishing a criminal chamber within the International Court of
Justice.
After studying the question, the ILC concluded that an inter-
national criminal court was both possible and desirable, but recom-
mended that it be a separate institution rather than a criminal
chamber of the International Court of Justice. Subsequently, in
1953, the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction sub-
270. Id. art. IX.
271. Id art. IV.
272. Id. art. VIII. The related acts are: (1) conspiracy to commit genocide; (2) direct and
public incitement to commit genocide; (3) an attempt to commit genocide; and (4) complicity
in the commission of the crime. Id. art. III.
273. Id art. VI.
274. G.A. Res. 260 (III)B, U.N. Doc. A/760, at 177 (1948).
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mitted a draft statute for a separate court.2 75 The General Assem-
bly concluded that the problems raised by the establishment of an
international criminal court were closely related to the question of
defining "aggression" and to the Proposed Draft Code of Offenses
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Thus, the General As-
sembly postponed consideration of an international criminal juris-
diction until it could consider all other reports on these related
questions.276 The realization that no genocide can be committed
without a state's commission or omission of any or all the elements
of the crime should be given careful consideration. Such acts
should be repressed not only because their apparent and immediate
victims are human beings, but also because they impair the peace
and security of mankind and threaten minimum world order.
277
C. The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind 278
In the Eichmann trial, genocide was said to be an international
crime. And yet, at the time of the commission of the offense, geno-
cide was not listed as punishable in any code, as is the usual case
with crimes defined by municipal law. Nonetheless, nations seek to
establish principles and to agree to definitions of acceptable con-
duct which, it is hoped, will encourage civilized behavior. Since the
end of World War II, the United Nations has sought to agree on a
code of offenses considered to be against the peace and security of
mankind. This effort may yet prove successful.
In 1947, the ILC was directed to "formulate the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nurernberg Tri-
bunal and in [its] judgment . . . . and to prepare a draft code of
offenses against the peace and security of mankind, indicating
clearly the place to be accorded th[ese] principles." '279 The ILC did
not prepare a text of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace
275. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report to the General As-
sembly by the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 7 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
11) 21, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952).
276. 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 23-26, U.N. Doc. A/2695 (1954). For a summary of
the matter, see Historical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Re-
port by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/7/Rev.i, at 30-46 (1949).
277. Reisman, Response to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide. An Appraisal of the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, I DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 29 (1971).
278. Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 9 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 9) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Draft Code of Offenses];
see also Appendix G infra, p. 296.
279. G.A. Res. 177(11), U.N. Doc. A/505, at 1280 (1947).
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and Security of Mankind until 1954.280
Several reasons for delay have been suggested as being most
important. First, the ILC was unclear as to the General Assembly's
intention in affirming the Nuremberg Principles. Second, the ILC
was uncertain as to the meaning of "formulation of principles al-
ready affirmed." Finally, the ILC was uncertain whether "formula-
tion" meant "a complete examination of the relationship between
international and municipal law."' 28 1 Undoubtedly, the most diffi-
cult problem for the ILC was dealing with the definition of "aggres-
sion," a key concept in the notion of peace and security.28 2 The
defendants at Nuremberg were found guilty of crimes against
peace, which included planning or waging a war of aggression. The
London Charter, however, did not define "aggression," and the
United Nations Charter assigns the determination of acts of aggres-
sion to the Security Council.283 The ILC was unable to define "acts
of aggression," although the Draft Code states that they include
"the employment by the authorities of a State of armed forces
against another State for any purpose other than national or collec-
tive self-defense or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation
of a competent organ of the United Nations.
28 4
As crimes under international law, the Draft Code list: (1)
genocide (as it was defined in the Genocide Convention);2 5 (2)
"acts in violation of the laws and customs of war;' 286 and (3) acts
defined as crimes against humanity by the London Charter (with-
out the qualification that they be committed in connection with the
waging of a war).287 A subtle distinction exists between "genocide"
and "crimes against humanity" as defined in the Draft Code. "Ge-
280. See Johnson, supra note 259, at 446-68.
281. Id at 446-47.
282. The concept ofjust and unjust wars has been struggled with for centuries, generally
unsuccessfully. See BRIERLY, supra note 137, at 28-35.
283. Johnson observed:
Its own Charter required that "aggression" be not defined. But the logical conclu-
sion of the various actions of the General Assembly seemed to be that "aggression"
must be defined. If aggression were not defined, how could it be possible to prepare
satisfactorily a code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind in
which the Nirnberg principles would be accorded a place? Above all, how would
it be possible - if aggression were not defined - to reconcile the new Code with
the maxim nullum crimen sine lege which the General Assembly had affirmed in
such express terms when it adopted Article 11(2) of [the] Universal Declaration of
Human Rights?
Johnson, supra note 259, at 448-49.
284. Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 278, art. 2(1).
285. Id. art. 2(10).
286. Id. art. 2(12).
287. Id. art. 2(11).
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nocide" can be committed by a private individual or a state, while
"crimes against humanity" may be committed "by the authorities
of a state or by private individuals acting at the instigation of or with
the toleration ofsuch authorities. ' 288 In effect, there is no validity to
the distinction between the two crimes since they both involve
wholesale human depredation which could not occur without the
state's instigation or acquiescence. Presumably, a dissident group
within a state could seize a part of the state's territory and commit
such crimes against the state's will. In any event, the responsibility
of the individual actors is always at stake. A question could arise,
however, with respect to the responsibility of "superiors" and to the
collective responsibility of the state. This would depend, of course,
upon the degree of involvement or control the "superiors" and rep-
resentatives of state agencies exercised over the situation, their abil-
ity to prevent the crime, and their failure to have taken appropriate
measures to do so.
By defining crimes against humanity as those violations of
human rights perpetrated by, or with the encouragement of, the
state, and by not utilizing this qualification when defining genocide,
the Draft Code illustrates the two factors which bring the violation
of human rights within the boundaries of international criminal
law. Violation of an individual's right to life, for example, is a
common crime, but when committed by the authorities of the state
it assumes added significance. Such a violation would be an "abuse
of sovereignty." '289 This state-sponsored outrage against the indi-
vidual is what Professor Drost refers to as "humanicide. '' 290 It is,
therefore, of concern to the world community.
In its usual form, genocide represents one category of humani-
cide. Genocide is a specific type of state-sponsored violation of
human rights. More specifically, international law takes cogni-
zance of genocide not because of the identity of the criminal, as is
generally the case with crimes against humanity, but because of the
identity of the victims. "Genocide is a crime against human rights
of persons collectively considered."
291
While the Draft Code has not yet been adopted by the General
Assembly, it must be noted that many of its provisions - such as
those concerning genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination -
are within the purview of other operative conventions. While the
288. Id (emphasis added).
289. P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: HUMANICIDE 348 (1959).
290. Id. at 347-48.
291. DROST, supra note 136, at 200.
Vol. 9
56
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST
Slavery Convention292 itself does not make slavery a crime, it may
be construed to have done so when viewed with the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Insti-
tutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.293 Furthermore, persecu-
tion on social, political, racial, religious, or cultural grounds, which
is prohibited by the Draft Code,2 94 is equivalent to inequality
before the law. Though not defined as a crime, inequality before
the law is covered by the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 295 and is now a pro-
posed crime in the Draft Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.2 96
D. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
297
The multivalue deprivatory conditions which affect specific
groups led to the gradual realization that such conditions are
threatening to minimum world order. Events that preceded World
War II - and experiences during that period - revealed that a
rational nexus exists between such deprivatory conditions and what
came to be recognized as an international crime, such as genocide.
The realization, however, that a process of systematic human de-
struction is not only limited to physical extermination but also ex-
tends to other forms of dehumanization, led to the enunciation of
"human rights" guarantees under the United Nations and subse-
quent human rights covenants, treaties, and conventions. The Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
is the culmination of a historical development which characterizes
this type of conduct as a form of international deviance requiring
the formulation of legal norms to impede it. Article 1 of the Con-
292. Done Sept. 26, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, reprinted in 21
AM. J. INT'L L. 171 (Supp. 1927) (official documents), andin BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note
228, at 121-27.
293. Done Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, [1957] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 59 (Cmd. 257), T.I.A.S.
No. 3532, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at 128-34. See also Bassiouni &
Nanda, Slavery and Slave Trade.- Steps Toward Its Eradication, 12 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 424
(1972).
294. See Draft Code of Offenses, supra note 278, art. 11.
295. See Discrimination Convention, infra note 297, arts. I & 5.
296. See 27 U.N. GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item 50), U.N. Doc. A/8880 (1971).
297. Openedfor Signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Discrimination Convention]. On the Convention's background, see
Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 15 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 996 (1966).
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vention defines racial discrimination as
[any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other
field of public life.298
The specific rights guaranteed and protected by the Conven-
tion are set out in detail in article 5. The basic policy of article 1
applies essentially to citizens. Its application to noncitizens is am-
biguous.299 It does not, for example, affect municipal laws on na-
tionality, citizenship, or naturalization as long as they do not
discriminate against a particular nationality.3" Article 1 further
provides:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals re-
quiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure to
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed
racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do
not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights
for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued
after the objectives for which they were taken have been
achieved.3 '
The exclusion stated therein is reiterated in article 2(l)(e) and arti-
cle 2(2) as well as in article 6. For all of its breadth, article 1 does
have defects. As Professor Reisman states:
[Even] [w]hen paragraph 1 is balanced with paragraph 4, the pre-
dominant conception of racial discrimination continues to be one
of severe repression of the vigorous demands of a subjugated
group. Discrimination may start in this manner, but at some
point it becomes a reciprocal process. The great wound of con-
tinuing discrimination is its internalization in the target; the dis-
criminated person who has, after years and perhaps generations
of alien acculturation, begun to adopt the image the discrimina-
tors hold of him and to doubt his own and his group's worth will
always lack sufficient self-awareness and self-confidence to avail
himself of the formal rights and prerogatives which the law pur-
ports to offer him. One of the most arduous and delicate chal-
lenges of the elimination of racial discrimination will be the
elimination of internalized or self-discrimination. This process
298. Discrimination Convention, supra note 297, art. 1.
299. Id. art. 1(2).
300. Id. art. 1(3).
301. Id. art. 1(4).
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may well involve violence to established structures and cultural
values within the discriminated group, for the elite of a discrimi-
nated group has often reached an accommodation with the sur-
rounding society of discrimination and may view any change as
a threat to its own, limited ascendancy. The various claims
which will inevitably be raised in a program of elimination of
racial discrimination under international auspices will be much
more realistically handled if those authorized to apply the Con-
vention operate with a grasp of the enormity and complexity of
the problems confronting them.
30 2
Articles 2 through 7 of the Convention set out the substantive
obligations of contracting parties. Three basic undertakings appear
in these six articles: (1) a governmental obligation to eliminate,
within official processes, all forms of racial discrimination; (2) a
governmental obligation to eliminate discrimination by individuals
and organizations within the state; and (3) a governmental obliga-
tion to undertake a developmental program.
The Convention relies on five jurisdictional authorities as im-
plementation processes: (1) the Security Council; (2) the General
Assembly; (3) the International Court of Justice; (4) United Nations
agencies (ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights); and
(5) the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.3 °3
This latter is the only new structure created by the Convention.
The Committee's function is to consider "legislative, judicial, ad-
ministrative, or other measures" adopted by governments 3°4 and to
decide on claims submitted. The procedure is quite elaborate30 5
and its implementation is likely to clarify the general substantive
provisions of the Convention while operating as a control mecha-
nism.
E State Responsibility and Human Rights
State responsibility hinges on the existence of an international
right or duty the transgression of which would cause certain conse-
quences requiring the attachment of a remedy or sanction. The
302. Reisman, supra note 277, at 46-47.
303. Discrimination Convention, supra note 297, art. 8. This Committee shall be elected
by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by states parties to the Convention. It shall
consist of 18 individuals of high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality who shall
serve in their individual capacity. Consideration will be given to an equitable geographical
distribution, and to the representation of the different forms of civilizations and principal
legal systems of the world. Id.
304. Id. art. 9.
305. See id. arts. 11-14.
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existence of state responsibility for violations of human rights de-
pends, therefore, on the answers to the following questions: (1)
what are these rights and where do they originate?; (2) what is their
binding legal effect?; and (3) what sanctions apply and who shall
apply them? In judicial terms, these questions require analysis of
the following issues: (1) the legally binding nature of human rights;
(2) the self-executing nature of obligations to preserve and protect
human rights; (3) the penetration of international law into munici-
pal law; and (4) the enforcement of human rights provisions. A
complete treatment of these questions is beyond the scope of this
analysis; however, some general observations must be made.
An initial observation focuses on the attitudes of municipal
courts towards internationally protected human rights. Too fre-
quently, decisions in cases alleging human rights violations stress
the distinction between violations of international law and viola-
tions of municipal law. Once this dichotomy is accepted, it is rela-
tively simple for municipal courts to consider themselves
jurisdictionally unimpaired by violations of international law and
competent to proceed with the case as if the violation of interna-
tional law did not exist. The rationale sustaining this dichotomy
between violations of internal law and violations of international
law is predicated on the doctrine of sovereignty whereby interna-
tional law has only limited penetration into municipal law. But it
also rests on one interpretive approach to the doctrine of separation
of powers in municipal law. Under this approach, violations of in-
ternational law are deemed within the prerogatives of the executive
and not the judiciary; furthermore, municipal courts assert that
they have no enforceable sanctioning powers over such violations
- only the executive can deal with such questions. Governments,
on the other hand, argue that human rights are nonenforceable by
municipal courts for a variety of reasons, including: (1) except as
provided by treaty, there are no binding international sanctions for
violations of human rights; (2) except as provided by treaty, there
are no existing binding obligations arising out of internationally
enunciated human rights that are applicable to municipal courts;
and (3) self-executing enforcement of internationally enunciated
human rights violates state sovereignty. The validity of these asser-
tions in the present state of international law is by no means as
clear-cut as either the proponents of human rights or the propo-
nents of state sovereignty claim. In fact, no other area of interna-
tional law is as riddled with confusion between lex lata and legge
ferenda as is the literature on the international protection of human
Vol. 9
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rights. Occasionally, one may even find some arguments in the na-
ture of lex desiderata which are incorrectly advanced as lex lata.
The central issue is not whether there are human rights3" but
whether there are rules for the protection of human rights with
enough specific content to be deemed legally binding on states and
to require enforcement. Thus, there is a need to identify the
sources of these rights. And there is a further need to determine
whether these sources refer to a specfc right, that is, one with a
sufficiently defined content requiring a sanction-remedy and apply-
ing to unlawful seizures and irregular rendition practices. The ap-
plicable sources of international law include the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, multilateral
treaties, decisions of international courts, and United Nations reso-
lutions. This classification is based upon the degree of applicability
and binding nature of specific obligations within the meaning of
internationally protected human rights.
The United Nations Charter refers to respect for human rights
in articles 1(3), 13(l)(b), 55(c), 62(2) and 76(c). The language of
article 55 is quite revealing:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well
being, which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall pro-
mote:
(c) Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion.
This language has been considered by some as a statement of prin-
ciples or as a goal, while others read it as stating Charter obliga-
tions. Article 56, however, states: "[a]ll members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organiza-
tion for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
This clear statement does not define the specific content of the obli-
gation, but the existence of an obligation to the "achievement of the
purposes" of human rights cannot be questioned.
A comprehensive summary of the issues over the obligation
imposed by the Charter and the arguments of the proponents of
306. See Bassioun, The "Human Rights Program" The Veneer of Civilization Thickens,
21 DE PAUL L. REV. 271 (1971). See also SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235.
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various positions has been made by Professor Schwelb. °7 One an-
swer appears in the position of the International Court of Justice in
its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of Sough Africa in Namibia (South West Af-
rica 308 which was unequivocal in the recognition that the Charter
imposes human rights obligations on member states and that the
obligations are self-executing. The court stated that South African
apartheid laws and decrees "constitute a violation of the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." 3" The Court
further held that
[u]nder the charter of the United Nations, the former mandatory
had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a territory on inter-
national states, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinctions as to race. To establish, indeed to enforce,
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations, restrictions
and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, color, de-
scent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes
and principles of the charter.3
Thus, by enunciating its purposes and principles on human rights,
the Charter establishes self-executing obligations that acquire their
specific content from the Charter as well as from other sources of
internationally protected human rights.
The issue appears to be whether the Charter, having estab-
lished certain general principles and purposes, can be said to incor-
porate specific rights which, by virtue of the evolutionary nature of
human rights, have developed and will continue to develop through
various sources of international law. The answer is in the affirma-
tive and, therefore, these specific rights must be ascertained to de-
termine their applicability. As a proponent of human rights, this
writer maintains that human rights should be considered interpre-
tive of the Charter and become self-executing under article 56.
One may raise the question of the legally binding effects of the
Human Rights Declaration. One school of thought contends that
since it is a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration has no
binding effect upon states. Another view holds that the Declaration
interprets Charter obligations. The most persuasive argument is
found in the separate opinion of Vice President Ammoun of the
307. Schwelb. The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972).
308. [1971] I.C.J. 16.
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International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa). Vice President Ammoun states:
The Advisory Opinion takes judicial notice of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. In the case of certain of the Dec-
laration's provisions, attracted by the conduct of South Africa, it
would have been an improvement to have dealt in terms with
their comminatory nature, which is implied in paragraphs 130
and 131 of the Opinion by the references to their violation.
In its written statement the French Government, alluding to
the obligations which South Africa accepted under the Mandate
and assumed on becoming a Member of the United Nations, and
to the norms laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, stated that there was no doubt that the Government of
South Africa had, in a very real sense, systematically infringed
those rules and those obligations. Nevertheless, referring to the
mention by resolution 2145 (XXI) of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, it objected that it was plainly impossible for
non-compliance with the norms it enshrined to be sanctioned
with the revocation of the Mandate, inasmuch as that Declara-
tion was not in the nature of a treaty binding upon states.
Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not bind-
ing qua international convention within the meaning of Article
38, paragraph l(a), of the Statute of the Court, they can bind
states on the basis of custom within the meaning of paragraph
1 (b), of the same Article, whether because they constituted a cod-
ification of customary law, as was said in respect of Article 6 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; or, because they
have acquired the force of custom through a general practice ac-
cepted as law, in the words of Article 38, paragraph l(b) of the
Statute. One right which must certainly be considered a preex-
isting binding customary norm, which the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights codified, is the right to equality, which, by
common consent has ever since the remotest times been deemed
inherent in human nature.
It is not by mere chance that in Article I of the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man there stands, so worded, this
primordial principle or axiom: 'All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights.'
From this first principle flow most rights and freedoms. The
ground was thus prepared for the legislative and constitutional
process which began with the first declarations or bills of rights
in America and Europe, continued with the constitutions of the
nineteenth century, and culminated in positive international law
in the San Francisco, Bogota and Addis Ababa charters, and in
63
International Law Journal: Table of Contents
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which has been con-
firmed by numerous resolutions of the United Nations, in partic-
ular, the above-mentioned declarations adopted by the General
Assembly in resolutions 1514(XV), 2625 (XXV) and 2627(XXV).
The Court in its turn has now confirmed it.
311
A quarter of a century ago, the Declaration of Human Rights
expressed the consensus of the member states. Since then it has
become a part of those general principles of international law rec-
ognized by civilized nations. Thus, the provisions of the Declara-
tion can be construed as legally binding because they interpret the
principles and purposes of the Charter, which contemplated such
rights as enunciated by the Declaration as if article 55 incorporates
the Declaration by anticipation. Furthermore, as part of interna-
tional law's "general principles," the transgression of its norms
could constitute a violation of international law to which state re-
sponsibility would attach.
Throughout the limited history of prosecution of international
crimes - which focused on the waging and initiation of unjust or
aggressive war and since Nuremberg for "crimes against humanity"
- direct responsibility under international law has been placed on
individuals. That does not, however, exclude the responsibility of
the state for international crimes, which is analogous to the munici-
pal criminal law concept of corporate responsibility. It is embodied
in the doctrine and practice of international reparations, which is a
hybrid between a criminal fine and civil damages.312 It should be
noted that whenever war reparations were imposed, they took one
of the following forms: (1) seizure by the victor of properties of the
defeated party; (2) the imposition of economic compensation; or (3)
the cession of territory by "agreement" of the defeated party.
The development of the concept of state responsibility for
crimes of state, such as the initiation of aggressive war or other vio-
lations such as "crimes against humanity," have certainly affirmed
the principle of a state's international criminal responsibility.
13
311. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 76.
312. See E. ARONEANU, LE CRIME CONTRE L'HUMANITE (1961); V. PELLA, LA
CRIMINALITE COLLECTIVE DES ETATS ET LE DROIT PENAL DE L'AVENIR (1949); Glaser,
L'Etal en Tant Que Personne Morale Est-il Pinalment Responsable?, 29 REVUE DE DROIT
PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 451 (1948). See also V. PELLA, LA GUERRE-CRIME ET LES
CRIMINELS DE GUiRRE: REFLECTIONS SUR LA JUSTICE PE'NALE INTERNATIONALE (1946).
313. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Internationally Wrongful
Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246/Add. 1-3
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Though international law has developed some guidelines for
wrongful acts committed by states, none exist with respect to a
state's criminal liability other than by analogy. 1 4 Nevertheless, the
Treaty of Versailles remains a landmark in the imposition of state
responsibility,315 as does the practice of World War I Allies against
Germany and Turkey, and World War II Allies against Germany,
Italy, and Japan. After World War II, the Federal Republic of
Germany paid substantial reparations to survivors of concentration
camps, to the families of the deceased, and to the State of Israel on
behalf of those Jews whom the Nazi regime had exterminated. The
principles of state responsibility extend to the collective responsibil-
ity of a state for individual acts of violations of international crimi-
nal law under the 1907 Hague Convention, which states that "[a]
belligerent party which violated the provision of the said regula-
tions shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part
of its armed forces." '316 The same approach is embodied in the
1949 Geneva Conventions.
The few cases of ad hoc international prosecution of war
(1971), reprinted in [19711 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
Ser.A/1971/Add.I (Part 1), citing landmark decisions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice and International Court of Justice as well as arbitral decisions; see also
M. WHITEMAN, I & VII DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1973); A. VERDROSS, VOLKER-
RECHT (5th ed. 1964); G. BALLADORE-PALLIERI, DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBLICO (8th ed.
1962); C. ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1944); P.
GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1944); OPPENHEIM, supra note 52; G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1957); J. PERSONNAZ, LA REPARATION
DU PREJUDICE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1938); C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); C. DE VISSCHER, I & II LA RESPONSABILITE
DES ETATS (1924); D. Anzilotti, Teoria Generale Della Responsabilita Della Stato del Diritto
Internazionale, in D. ANZILLOTII, CORSO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (1928); K. STRUPP,
II HANDBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS-DAS VOLKERRECHLICHE DELIKT (1933); E. VATTEL,
LE DROIT DES GENS (1758).
314. Munch, State Responsibility in International Criminal Law, in I BASSIOUNI &
NANDA, supra note 25, at 143; Triffterer, Jurisdiction over Statesfor Crimes of State, in I1 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 143 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); 0.
TRIFFTERER, DOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES MATERIELLEN
VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS SEIT NURNBERG (1966); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); F. MUNCH, DAS VOLKERRECHLICHE DELIKT (1963); G.
DAHM, ZUR PROBLEMATIK DES VOLKERSTRAFRECHTS (1956). The term ddlit international is
attributed to G. SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPLES ET SYSTEMATIQUE (1932).
315. See JESCHECK, supra note 33; F. BERBER, DIKTAT VON VERSAILLES (1939); J. CAS-
TILLON, LES REPARATIONS ALLEMANDE-DEUx EXPERIENCES: 1919-1932, 1945-1952
(1953).
316. Regulations, supra note 50, art. 3.
317. See Prisoners of War Convention, supra note 140, art. 131; Protection of Civilians
Convention, supra note 140, art. 148; Wounded and Sick Convention, supra note 140, art. 5 I;
Wounded at Sea Convention, supra note 140, art. 52.
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crimes reveals the difficulties inherent in such an approach. Surely
they disclose the absence of a worldwide political will to pursue a
direct enforcement system at an international level.
III. CONCLUSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
PROGRAM
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the United Nation's General Assembly in 1948, the com-
mon aspirations of mankind have been symbolized by an extraordi-
nary and unprecedented outpouring of concern for increased
protection of all basic human rights. This activity set in motion
demands for the codification of human rights law, to be accompa-
nied by effective measures of implementation. As a result, there is
today an impressive catalogue of human rights recognized in vari-
ous conventions, treaties, agreements, and protocols covering al-
most every aspect of mankind's basic values.318 But there are few
tasks which have had less fulfillment than the realization of the ba-
sic values of mankind. Indeed, the formulation of world commu-
nity aspirations is a far cry from their translation into authoritative
proscriptions. 1 9
The uneven progression of the "Human Rights Program"
should not obscure the fact that some advances have been made.
The lack of progress is due in no small part to the latent ambigui-
ties contained in the very concept of human rights.32° Those ambi-
guities are inherent in the formulation and actuation of human
rights as a social process with roots ascertainable in individual and
318. See generally Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/4 (1967).
319. Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional
Organizations, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 307 (1972).
320. Moskowitz succinctly poses the problem:
[I]nternational human rights is still waiting for its theoretician to systematize the
thoughts and speculations on the subject and to define desirable goals. Intelligent
truisms do not necessarily add up to a theory. No one has yet arisen to draw to-
gether a positive synthesis of the facts and fancies which emerge daily from events
of bewildering complexity and to carry on an authentic debate. International con-
cern with human rights is still very much a theme begging for a writer. And the
scholar has not yet appeared to redress the distortions through a calm and system-
atic application of facts, to ground abstractions in the specific, and to define the
limits of discourse. In the absence of a definite body of doctrine, as well as of
deeply rooted convictions, international human rights have been dealt with on the
basis of the shifts and vagaries of daily affairs and of evocations of daily events.
There is a great need for technical resources and ability to channel the facts to
greater effect. Human rights as a matter of international concern is an untrodden
area of systematic research. But still a greater need is for superlative virtuosity to
deal with international human rights in their multiple human dimensions.
M. MosKowiTz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 98-99 (1968).
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collective basic values. The recognition and at least limited appli-
cation of authoritative proscriptions in specific areas - for exam-
ple, slavery - confirms the need to avoid these ambiguities. Thus,
the scope of the inquiry must be narrowed to specifics by applying
means which are commensurate with the gradual development of
human aspirations.32" '
The minimum indispensable requirements for a dignified
human existence include the rights of life, liberty, and equality.322
These three rights have been expressed in specific conventions
prohibiting genocide, slavery, forced prostitution, and racial dis-
crimination.323 Moreover, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and its Optional Protocol,3 24 in addition to the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
3 25
offers a wide spectrum of protection regarding life, liberty, equality,
and human dignity. The United Nations has several bodies
charged with the implementation of human rights. Some United
Nations sponsored human rights treaties have even created their
own enforcement mechanisms, such as the United Nations Division
of Human Rights, the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-
Commission on the Protection of Minorities and Elimination of
Discrimination, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination.326
321. McDougal, Lasswel &Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order. 4 Framework
for Policy-Orienled Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 237 (1969).
322. See id. at 267. Let it be said immediately that a certain minimum of values indis-
pensable to a dignified human existence must be prescribed as immune from all claims of
derogation at all times. Notable among these are the right to life, freedom from torture and
inhuman treatment, freedom from involuntary human experimentations, freedom from slav-
ery, the slave trade and servitude, freedom from imprisonment for debt, freedom from retro-
active application of criminal punishment, the right to recognition as a human being, and
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. These rights and freedoms are indispensable
to a dignified human existence and must remain wholly intact from derogation upon grounds
of crisis. In terms of our basic postulation, it can never be necessary to encroach upon these
rights and freedoms, even in time of emergency. Nor would their deprivation ever be pro-
portional. If the emerging concept ofjus cogens is to be given rational meaning in the con-
text of a world public order of human dignity, its bedrock must be in this minimal protection
of human rights.
323. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 255; Discrimination Convention, supra
note 297. See also McDougal & Arens, supra note 255. A Draft Convention on the Preven-
tion and Suppresion of Torture is now before the United Nations. See Bassiouni & Derby,
An Appraisal of Torture in International Law and Practice.- The Needfor an International
Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENAL 16 (1977).
324. 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
325. Id. at 49.
326. See generally SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 505-913.
67
International Law Journal: Table of Contents
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
It has not been only the United Nations, by way of resolution,
declaration, and convention that has sought to define and protect
human rights. Efforts have been conducted on a regional basis
which have culminated in conventions securing the same rights that
have been declared fundamental by the United Nations. One of
these is the American Convention on Human Rights3 27 which is
patterned after United Nations sponsored human rights treaties.
The other is the European Convention on Human Rights,328 signed
in Rome in 1950, which is the prototype of non-United Nations
sponsored treaties, the purpose of which is to promote and protect
human rights.
The European Convention is like many United Nations spon-
sored treaties in that it requires contracting parties to agree to take
the necessary steps to secure the rights affirmed in the Convention.
It is unlike certain United Nations sponsored conventions (the Ge-
nocide Convention, for example), which rely upon United Nations
structures for their implementation.3 29 Nevertheless, United Na-
tions sponsored human rights conventions contain effective provi-
sions for their implementation, 330  whereas the European
Convention provides for a European Court of Human Rights
33'
and the possibility for individuals to petition the European Human
Rights Commission 332 to insure the effective implementation of
327. Done Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/ 1. 1 (Nov. 1969); see also the American Declaration of the Human Rights and Duties
of Man, Resolution XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotd,
Colombia, March 30-May 2, 1948, FinalAct (Pan-American Union 1948) 48; The Establish-
ment of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.
L/V/I1.17 Dec. 1967. See SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1267; Cabranes,
Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Inter-American System, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1147
(1967); Buergenthal, The American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes, 21
BUFFALO L. REV. 121 (1971); Thomas & Thomas, Human Rights and the Organization of
American States, 12 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 319 (1972).
328. Done Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, [1953] Gr. Brit. T.S. 71 (Cmd. 8969) (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. See generally SoHN &
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 999-1266; F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1975).
329. See generally SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1267-1373.
330. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39-51.
331. European Convention, supra note 328, art. 19(2). See also id. arts. 38-56.
332. See id. arts. 20-37. Cases alleging a state's failure to uphold the provisions of the
Convention do not go directly to the court; they must first be heard by the Human Rights
Commission which then may send the case to the court, or it may be brought to the court in
certain circumstances after the Commission has attempted to settle the case. If the court
finally does reach a decision, the judgment is final and binding on the parties who have
agreed to be bound by the Convention. See id. arts. 47, 48, 52 & 53.
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human rights.333
The performance of the European Commission on Human
Rights has proven to be less spectacular than expected. Of the first
3,797 petitions received from individuals, it accepted only 52 for
consideration. 334 Nevertheless, the Convention still signifies an im-
portant development in the growth of international law. The efforts
it represents, however imperfect and disappointing, as well as the
efforts represented by all international agreements seeking to pro-
tect human rights, must not be abandoned. 335 As M. Teitgen of
France reported to the Council of Europe in 1949:
Democracies do not become Nazi Countries in one day. Evil
progresses cunningly .... One by one, freedoms are suppressed
... . Public opinion and the entire national conscience are as-
phyxiated. And then, when everything is in order, the 'Fuhrer' is
installed and the evolution continues even to the oven of the cre-
matorium. It is necessary to intervene before it is too late. A
conscience must exist somewhere which will sound the alarm to
the minds of a nation menaced by this progressive corruption, to
warn them of the peril and to show them that they are progress-
ing down a long road which leads far, sometimes even to Buch-
enwald or Dachau. An international court. . . and a system of
supervision and guarantees could be the conscience of which we
all have need . .. 336
These proposed ideas are not at variance with those of the
many scholars who have proposed the codification of international
criminal law and the creation of an international criminal court
with an enforcement mechanism.337 Its likelihood may be in ques-
333. A State must specially declare that it recognizes the competence of the Commission
to receive individual petitions. Id. art. 25. As of 1973, 12 states had so declared. See SOHN
& BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1009.
334. For a general discussion and history of the functioning of the European Human
Rights Commission and the European Court of Human Rights, see SOHN & BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 235, at 999-1265; Robertson, The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1950); Weil, The Evolution of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1963); Greenberg & Shalit, New Horizons
for Human Rights: The European Convention, Court, and Commission 0/Human Rights, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (1963); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1977).
335. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 228, at 338.
336. Robertson, The Political Background and Historical Development of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 24, 25 (Supp. No. 11) (1965), quotedin
SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 235, at 1002.
337. See Dautricourt, supra note 302, at 636; Kos-Rabcewicz Zubkowski, The Creation of
an International Criminal Court, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 519
(M. Bassiouni ed. 1975); Grebing, La Cration d'une Cour Pinale Internationale, 45 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENAL 435 (1975); Markus, Les Possibilites et les Conditions de la
Jurisdiction Pinale Internationale, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PiNAL 453 (1975).
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tion, however, since the trend is to pursue an indirect control model
instead of the direct control model which the creation of an interna-
tional criminal jurisdiction would reflect.33
The "Holocaust" is all too often left only to Jews to remember
and to commemorate. Yet, the "Holocaust" is not merely a Jewish
tragedy, it is the tragedy of all mankind. Consequently, the "Holo-
caust" must not gradually become the exclusive concern of one
people but must be considered a part of the history of all people.
Never again! must become the motto of all humankind; otherwise,
it would be too facile to rationalize such events as simply the result
of intergroup conflict, as has been the case, for example, with re-
gard to Biafrans, the people of Bangladesh, black southern Afri-
cans, and the Palestinians.339 It is all a matter of degree. Should
the observance of human rights not become truly universalized,
both in theory and in practice, acceptance of human depredation
becomes all too inviting.
The conscience of the world must be constantly reminded of
the "Holocaust" and other similar events so that genocide and
other serious human depredations may be avoided in the future.
What is at stake is the very preservation of humanity and the thin
veneer of its civilization. To that end the rule of law should be
strengthened to become the barrier between atavism and human-
ism. This article is written in the spirit of universal humanism and
with a view to advance respect for and observation of basic human
rights for all peoples of the world regardless of race, religion, color,
ethnic origin, or sex.
For two comprehensive texts on the subject, see TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (J. Stone & R. Woetzel eds. 1970); P. CARJEU, PROJET D'UNE JURISDIC-
TION PiNALE INTERNATIONALE (1953).
338. See generally Bassiouni, An Appraisal ofthe Growth and Developing Trends of Inter-
national Criminal Law, 45 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL 405 (1975).
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APPENDIX A
HAS THE UNITED STATES COMMITTED GENOCIDE
AGAINST THE AMERICAN INDIAN?
The question whether the United States, for the past 200 years,
has committed genocide against the American Indian does not ad-
mit an easy answer. The confusion lies in determining (1) what is
required to be convicted of genocide, and (2) what has been the
past and present policy of the government toward the American
Indian. The most widely accepted international statement of what
constitutes genocide is found in the Genocide Convention.'
Initially, there are two major obstacles to charging the United
States with genocide, neither of which will be considered here.
First, can the United States be charged and convicted of a crime
which it has never acknowledged? - the United States has never
ratified the Genocide Convention.2 Second, can a government be
charged with genocide at all?
3
Aside from the above problems, the major issue in determining
whether the United States has been guilty of committing genocide
against the American Indian is whether the "specific intent" ele-
ment has been present. The Genocide Convention defines the
crime as:
[those acts] committed with intent to destroy, in whole or inpart, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about its physical destruction; ....
1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature Dec. 8, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, (1949) Can. T.S. No. 27 (entered into force Jan.
12, 1951) [hereinafter cited as Genocide Convention].
2. Accord, Bedau, Genocide in Vietnam?, 53 B.U. L. REV. 574, 583 (1973).
3. The Convention provides that only "persons" can be charged with Genocide: "Per-
sons committing genocide shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. IV.
To charge a government with this crime would require a loose interpretation of the meaning
of article IV. See Bedau, supra note 2, at 582.
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(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
One can recall numerous horrible accounts of atrocities com-
mitted against the Indians - Trail of Tears and Wounded Knee, to
name but two. Yet, it would appear to be a difficult task to prove
that the United States acted with the requisite "specific intent." It
has been argued that one can imply the mental element to commit
genocide by circumstantial proof where a large number of victims
have been affected.' However, the contrary position seems to be
the prevailing view. For example, atrocities committed against the
American blacks6 and against the South Vietnamese both fail to
qualify as acts of genocide because the requirement of an actual,
specific intent can not be proven with either a constructive or an
implied malice model.'
If we assume that there is an actual, specific intent required for
the commission of the crime of genocide, it is difficult to prove any
violation of the Genocide Convention by the United States, espe-
cially before 1887. For example, from 1790 to 1834 there were sev-
eral statutes enacted for the purpose of removing Indians from
desirable Eastern lands to the West - away from civilization.
Notwithstanding the massive loss of life, there appears to be no evi-
dence that these statutes were enacted with the "intent" to destroy
the Indians. An example of this type of act was the "Trail of
Tears," a forced migration of thousands of Indians from Georgia to
Oklahoma.8 The Removal Act,9 which authorized much of this
senseless loss of life, had as its purpose the civilization and educa-
tion of the Indian.' 0 In 1835, President Jackson said that he felt the
Indians would have a better chance of survival if they were moved
West."I It would seem, then, that the specific genocidal intent was
lacking up to this point. Although isolated army and government
4. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. II (emphasis added).
5. Comment, The United States andthe 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J.
683, 692 (1975).
6. Goldberg & Gardner, Time To Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A. J. 141,
144 (1972).
7. Bedau, supra note 2, at 599-620.
8. A. JOSEPHY, THE INDIAN HERITAGE OF AMERICA 323 (Bantam ed. 1966).
9. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to Preserve
Peace on the Frontiers, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
10. Reid, Conflict and Injustice.'A Discussion offrancis Paul Pracha's "'American Indian
Policy in the Formative Years," 39 N.D. L. REv. 50, 53-54 (1963).
11. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 260-61 (7th ed. H. Commager 1963).
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officials might have had the specific intent, it has not been conclu-
sively established that a nexus exists between their individual mo-
tives and official government policy.
The next era of American Indian-United States relations was
heralded with the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887,12
by which tribal land was distributed to individual Indians. The
concept of assimilation - assimilating one culture into another -
does not appear in the Act's preamble.' 3 However, it would appear
from debates and other reports that assimilation was in fact the ac-
tual goal. 4 And it should be noted that this legislation did not ter-
minate tribal existence if the Indians so elected; thus the Indians
were able to preserve their tribal identity.'5 In the New Deal, this
policy was temporarily halted with the Indian Reorganization Act'
6
which attempted to reorganize the tribal units. In 1953, the latter
policy again seemed to be reversed by House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 108'7 which was to end Federal regulation of Indians. The
purpose of the Act' 8 was to end encroachments on the freedom of
Indians - part of a major goal of the Eisenhower Administration
to limit big government.' 9
It can be seen through this period - from 1887 - that the
requisite specific intent would be difficult to prove, particularly
from the New Deal forward. It might be argued that the aim of the
General Allotment Act of 1887 was to assimilate the American In-
dian, which could be construed as containing the requisite intent to
commit genocide. By "assimilation" is not meant necessarily that
the formulators of the policy wished to "destroy" the group, but
rather that they intended to "change" the group. As one govern-
ment official noted at the time, "[t]he American Indian is to become
the Indian American."'2 The Indian tribe itself was not prohibited
from existing. While it cannot be denied that numerous atrocities
12. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 338 (1887), as amended by 25 U.S.C. 331-
358 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Allotment Act].
13. Id.
14. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 208-09 (1942).
15. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
16. Indian Reorganization Act, Organization of Indian Tribes, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987
(1934), as amended by 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1976).
17. Resolution on the Status of Indians in the United States, H.R. Cong. Res. 108, 83d
Cong., Ist Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 10815 (1953).
18. Indian Termination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1976).
19. M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 582-83 (1974).
20. Statement of Commissioner Morgan of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, July 1, 1889,
citedin R. BURNETTE & J. KOSTER, THE ROAD TO WOUNDED KNEE 147 (Bantam ed. 1974).
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were committed against American Indians, the requisite "specific
intent" of the United States to commit genocide has not been estab-
lished.
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
United States involvement in Vietnam raised several contro-
versial issues in the area of international law.' Two such questions
are: (1) whether the United States was guilty of genocide;2 and (2)
whether the United States committed "war crimes" in Southeast
Asia.3
In light of the definition of genocide,4 there are at least three
essential elements to be considered in determining the material ele-
ment and the mental element needed to prove a charge of genocide:
(1) the existence of a separate national, ethnical, racial, or reli-
gious group sufficiently distinct and identifiable to be capable of
identification as a victim of genocidal acts; (2) the commission of
acts performed as part of a plan to destroy, in whole or in part, this
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group; and (3) a specific in-
tent to destroy this group as a whole or in part. None of these ele-
ments are present in the facts surrounding United States activities
in Southeast Asia. This is true for a number of reasons.
First, the opposing parties in the Vietnam conflict did not in-
clude a separate national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The
nature of the Vietnam conflict was, at one time, a subject of strong
political controversy. It has now, however, been internationally
1. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States Par-
ticipation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085 (1968); Moore, International Law and
the United States Role in Viet Nam; 4 Reply, 76 YALE L.J. 1051 (1976).
2. See Bedau, Genocide in Vietnam?, 53 B.U. L. REV. 574 (1973); Goldberg & Gardner,
Time To Act on the Genocide Convention, 58 A.B.A. J. 141 (1972); Phillips & Deutsch, Pitfalls
of the Genocide Convention, 56 A.B.A. J. 641 (1970).
3. Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident, 49 ORE. L. REV. 260 (1970).
4. See text accompanying note 5, Appendix A supra. At present, the United States is
not a party to this Convention. See note 213 supra, p. 264. Several respected members of the
American legal community have suggested, however, that the United States reconsider its
position. See Goldberg & Gardner, supra note 2, Bitker, Genocide Revisited, 56 A.B.A.J. 71
(1970). But see Phillips & Deutsch, supra note 2. For a discussion of this Convention, see
Bassiouni, Genocide and Racial Discrimination, in I A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAW 522 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973).
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recognized as a civil war. The United States allied itself in this
conflict with the South Vietnamese nationals and directed its activi-
ties against the Viet Cong, a term designating members of the in-
surgent military force. The Viet Cong did not qualify as, nor did
they ever claim to be, a separate national, ethnical, racial, or reli-
gious group.5 In fact, the national, ethnical, racial, and religious
composition of the South Vietnamese nationals and the Viet Cong
were essentially identical. The only groups so strongly concen-
trated on one side as to be conceivably in a position to suffer geno-
cide were the Catholics, Cao Dais, and Montagnards, all on the
South Vietnamese-American side. The absence of the one essential
element of an identifiable group alone invalidates any possible
charge of genocide that might conceivably be made against the
United States as a result of its activities in Vietnam.6
Second, American activities in Vietnam could not be classified
as part of a coordinated plan to destroy in whole or inpart any par-
ticular national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The sole Amer-
ican actions which might arguably approximate such acts were the
establishment of free fire zones and massive bombing raids on
North Vietnam. These actions, however, clearly do not qualify, al-
though they could constitute war crimes. However, the factors of
"military necessity" and "proportionality" must be considered. Ar-
ticle 22 of the Hague Regulations7 establishes that the means by
which one party may inflict injury upon another are not unlimited.
Such means are subject to scrutiny in light of the military necessity
of the particular tactical situation involved. Furthermore, article 23
of the Hague Regulations establishes that there must be some "pro-
portionality" between the amount and type of force used and the
legitimate military objective that is being sought, so that unneces-
sary injury and destruction are avoided. Additionally, military op-
erations conducted as acts of political reprisal must not be out of
proportion to the provocation received.8 There is, however, a pre-
5. There have been attempts to expand the definitions of national, ethnical, racial, and
religious groups beyond those commonly accepted at present by the international commu-
nity. See Niset, La Sous-Commission de la Lutte Contre les Mesures Diseriminatoires el de la
Protection des Minoriikms des Nations Unies a Sa Vingi-Sixilme Session, 6 HUMAN RIGHTS J.
565 (1973) (attempt to classify Marxism as a religion, thus making all anti-Marxist acts geno-
cidal). Such attempts, however, have not been successful.
6. A different conclusion might have been possible had the parties in the conflict been
clearly separable for national, ethnical, racial, or religious reasons. This would be the case in
a hypothetical conflict between the Serbians and Croatians in Yugoslavia. This, however,
was not the case in Vietnam.
7. See note 50 supra, p. 209.
8. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 401 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
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sumption of legitimacy given to any particular military operation.
Proof of a violation of either the "principle of necessity" or of the
"principle of proportionality" must be established before a charge
of committing war crimes may be confirmed.
As to any charges of genocide, citing the establishment of free
fire zones or United States bombing raids on North Vietnam, it
may be noted that the inhabitants of proposed free fire zones were
warned to, evacuate the area prior to official designation of these
zones. Those who remained did so voluntarily, and they did not
constitute a separate national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.
Hence, any injuries suffered by them cannot be deemed genocidal.
Moreover, in bombing North Vietnam, the United States utilized
an internationally recognized military tactic against a legitimate
military target.' Specific individual casualties of noncombatants
which resulted either during these raids or during other legitimate
military operations were incidental to these operations. While spe-
cial provision is made for such incidents in international law,'o they
are not classified as genocidal acts.
Third, American activities in Vietnam were not conducted
with sufficient intent to support a charge of genocide. It is firmly
established that the crime of genocide is one of specific intent."'
There is insufficient evidence to indicate that there was any specific
intent, either expressed or implied, on the part of the United States
to destroy in whole or in part, any national, ethnical, racial, or reli-
gious group." Absent such a specific intent, no charge of genocide
can validly be made against the United States.
In conclusion, it may be noted that the absence of any one of
the three essential elements of genocide sufficiently invalidates a
charge of this offense. That all three essential elements are absent
in the case of American involvement in Southeast Asia definitively
defeats such an accusation and firmly establishes the innocence of
the United States in this matter.'
3
9. MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 822 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
10. Id. at 819.
11. See Bedau, supra note 2, at 580.
12. For a discussion of different models suggested to imply specific intent, see Bedau,
supra note 2, at 599-620.
13. There are those who have reached an opposite conclusion. For example, Bertrand
Russell, together with his Peace Foundation, organized a nongovernmental International
War Crimes Tribunal. This Tribunal, in 1967, found the United States guilty of acts of
genocide in Vietnam. This finding, however, had such a minute discernible effect in this
country that one may doubt the credibility of the Russell Tribunal as a substantial commen-
tator on international affairs. See Bedau, supra note 2, at 574-75.
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The question of United States guilt has also been suggested in
relation to the occasional war crimes that occurred in the more than
a decade of American involvement in Southeast Asia. None of
these, however, was ever found to be part of a larger plan calling
for the extermination, in whole or in part, of any given national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group. The My Lai Massacre was the
most widely publicized example of a war crime involving American
personnel in Vietnam. The incident at Son My (My Lai) occurred
on March 16, 1968. Lieutenant Calley, the principal offender in-
volved, was charged with four counts, alleging premeditated mur-
der of 107 male and female Vietnamese civilians in the village of
Son My. Two additional counts were added, alleging the premedi-
tated murder of a Vietnamese adult and a Vietnamese child of ap-
proximately two years of age. Because no United States civilian
court had jurisdiction, trial was conducted by military court-mar-
tial under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
On November 24, 1969, Major General Orwin Talbott, OG, Fort
Benning, Georgia, determined that there was sufficient evidence to
warrant a trial and referred the charges against Lieutenant Calley
for trial by general court martial. Evidence presented at trial indi-
cated that Lieutenant Calley's platoon encountered no hostile fire
in the village, and that the only casualty was a soldier who shot
himself in the foot. The evidence indicated that the people that
Lieutenant Calley was charged with killing were unresisting, un-
armed, and that they had come completely within the control of
Lieutenant Calley and his troops. Impanelling of the court began
on November 12, 1970. The prosecution began to present its case
on November 17, 1970. The court, on March 29, 1971, found Lieu-
tenant Calley guilty of premeditated murder of not less than 22
noncombatant Vietnamese civilians and of assault with intent to
murder one Vietnamese noncombatant civilian. On March 31,
1971, he was sentenced for life to confinement at hard labor, total
forfeiture of all pay allowances, and dismissal from the service.
Action was also taken against two sergeants in Calley's Com-
pany; both were court-martialed for intent to murder. These men,
however, were acquitted. Several of Calley's superiors were admin-
istratively reprimanded for alleged attempts to cover up the My Lai
incident. For example, Major General Samuel Moster, Calley's Di-
vision commander, was demoted and stripped of his Distinguished
Service Medal by Army Secretary Stanley Resor for failure to ade-
quately investigate the My Lai incident. By May, 1971, twenty-
four men were charged by the Army with violations of the Uniform
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Code of Military Justice. Proceedings against twenty-three of these
men resulted in the charges being dropped or in acquittal.
The prosecution of these individuals, and the conviction of
Lieutenant Calley, clearly establishes that their conduct at My Lai
was not an authorized part of planned American activities."4 Fur-
thermore, all United States armed forces personnel were instructed
in the nature of and penalties for war crimes. 5 They were re-
quired, as a part of their standing orders, to report immediately the
occurrence of any such crimes when detected. These procedures
clearly establish that any United States personnel who committed
war crimes in Vietnam broke the bond of agency between them-
selves and the United States government prior to the commission of
such acts. These war crimes, therefore, cannot be viewed as official
acts of the United States government. The fact that at least 21 other
United States personnel were convicted by the United States gov-
ernment for war crimes in Vietnam confirms that the commission
of these offenses was neither the intent nor the desire of the United
States.
APPENDIX C
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG:
INDICTMENT'
I. The United States of America, the French Republic, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics by the undersigned, Robert H.Jackson,
Francois de Menthon, Hartley Shawcross and R.A. Rudenko, duly
appointed to represent their respective Governments in the investi-
gation of the charges against and the prosecution of the major war
criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of London dated 8th August,
1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed thereto, hereby ac-
cuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set forth, of Crimes
against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity, and of a
14. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leadership Responsibility, 57 MIL. L.
REV. 99 (1972).
15. Westerman, A New Approach in Disseminating the Geneva Conventions, 45 MIL. L.
REV. 99 (1969).
1. U.S. Dept. of State, Trial of War Criminals 23, Dept. of State Pub. No. 2420 (1945).
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Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes, all as de-
fined in the Charter of the Tribunal, and accordingly name as de-
fendants in this cause and as indicated on the counts hereinafter set
out: Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter
Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Hulbach,
Karl Donitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schtrach, Fritz Sauckel, Al-
fred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur Seyn Inquart,
Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath and Hans Fritzsche, individ-
ually and as members of any of the Groups or Organizations next
hereinafter named.
II. The following are named as Groups or Organizations (since
dissolved) which should be declared criminal by reason of their
aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof and in
connection with the conviction of such of the named defendants as
were members thereof; Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das
Korps Der Politischen Leiter Der National-Sozialislischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die Schutzstaf-
feln Der National-Sozialistischen Deutschen Ar-Beitervartei (com-
monly known as the "SS") and including Die Sicherheitsdienst
(commonly known as the "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizet (Secret
State Police, commonly known as the "Gestapo"); Die
SuIrmabteilungen Die N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the "SA");
and the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces ....
COUNT ONE-THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY (Charter,
Article 6, Especially 6(a))
All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated as leaders, or-
ganizers, instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the
commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and,
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, are individually
responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any
persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy. The common
plan or conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against
Peace, in that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated and
waged wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of in-
ternational treaties, agreements or assurances. In the development
and course of the common plan or conspiracy it came to embrace
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the commission of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the
defendants determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against
countries and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of
war, including as typical and systematic means by which the wars
were prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor
and for other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territor-
ies, murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on
the high seas, the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of
public and private property, the wanton destruction of cities, towns,
and villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity.
The common plan or conspiracy contemplated and came to em-
brace as typical and systematic means, and the defendants deter-
mined upon and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within
Germany and within occupied territories, and other inhumane acts
committed against civilian populations before and during the war,
and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, in execu-
tion of the plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal
wars, many of such acts and persecutions being violations of the
domestic laws of the countries where perpetrated ....
COUNT TWO--CRIMEs AGAINST PEACE (Charter, Article 6(a))
All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8th May, 1945, participated in the planning,
preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which
were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and
assurances . ...
COUNT THREE-WAR CRIMES (Charter, Article 6,
Especially 6(b))
All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1st Sep-
tember, 1939, and 8th May, 1945 in Germany and in all those coun-
tries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1st
September, 1939, and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on
the High Seas.
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated
and executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit War Crimes
as defined in Article 6(b) of the Charter. This plan involved,
among other things, the practice of "total war" including methods
of combat and of military occupation in direct conflict with the
laws and customs of war, and the commission of crimes perpetrated
on the field of battle during encounters with enemy armies, and
Vol. 9
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against prisoners of war, and in occupied territories against the ci-
vilian population of such territories.
The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and
by other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible
(under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when com-
mitting the said War Crimes performed their acts in execution of a
common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in
the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the
defendants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators and ac-
complices.
These methods and crimes constituted violations of interna-
tional conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general princi-
ples of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized
nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of
conduct ....
COUNT FOUR--CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Charter, Article 6,
Especially 6(c))
All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity dur-
ing a period of years preceding 8th May, 1945 in Germany and in
all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed
forces since 1st September, 1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia
and in Italy and on the High Seas.
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated
and executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes
against Humanity as defined in Article 6(c) of the Charter. This
plan involved, among other things, the murder and persecution of
all who were or who were suspected of being opposed to the com-
mon plan alleged in Count One.
The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the de-
fendants and by other persons for whose acts the defendants are
responsible, (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons,
when committing the said War Crimes, performed their acts in exe-
cution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War
Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which plan and con-
spiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, organizers, insti-
gators and accomplices.
These methods and crimes constituted violations of interna-
tional conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general princi-
ples of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized
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nations and were involved in and part of a systematic course of
conduct. The said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter.
The prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count
Three as also constituting Crimes against Humanity.2
APPENDIX D
EXCERPTS FROM JUDGMENT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL
SEPTEMBER 30, 1946
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression-Opinion and Judgment (1947)
On the 8th August 1945 the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the
United States of America, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics entered into an Agreement establishing this Tribu-
nal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular
geographical location. In accordance with Article 5, the following
Governments of the United Nations have expressed their adher-
ence to the agreement: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Nether-
lands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia,
Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand,
India, Venezuela, Uraguay, and Paraguay.
By the Charter annexed to the Agreement, the constitution, ju-
risdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were defined ....
Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tribunal have
been held; 33 witnesses gave evidence orally for the prosecution
against the individual defendants, and 61 witnesses, in addition to
19 of the defendants, gave evidence for the defense.
A further 143 witnesses gave evidence for the defense by
means of written answers to interrogatories.
The Tribunal appointed commissioners to hear evidence relat-
ing to the organizations, and 101 witnesses were heard for the de-
2. The indictment was signed by Robert H. Jackson for the United States, Francois de
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fense before the commissioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other
witnesses were submitted. Six reports were also submitted, summa-
rizing the contents of a great number of further affidavits.
Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed by 155,000 people,
were submitted on behalf of the Political leaders, 136,213 on behalf
of the SA, 7000 on behalf of the S.D., 7000 on behalf of the General
Staff and OKW, and 200 on behalf of the Gestapo.
The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the organizations.
The documents tendered in evidence for the prosecution of the in-
dividual defendants and the organizations numbered several
thousands. A complete stenographic record of everything said in
court has been made, as well as an electrical recording of all the
proceedings.
Copies of all the documents put in evidence by the prosecution
have been supplied to the defense in the German language. The
applications made by the defendants for the production of wit-
nesses and documents raised serious problems in some instances,
on account of the unsettled state of the country. It was also neces-
sary to limit the number of witnesses to be called, in order to have
an expeditious hearing, in accordance with Article 18(c) of the
Charter.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement
and Charter, and the crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set
out in Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding
upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich un-
conditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these coun-
tries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by
the civilized world. The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of
power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the
great importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has
heard full argument from the prosecution and the defense, and will
express its view on the matter.
It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental
principle of all law - international and domestic - is that there
can be no punishment of crime without a preexisting law. Nullum
crimen sine legel, nullapoena sine lege. It was submitted that expost
facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized nations,
1979
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that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the
time the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had
defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its com-
mission, and no court had been created to try and punish offenders.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the Maxim nullum
crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a
principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who
in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring
states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circum-
stances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far
from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the positions they did
in the government of Germany, the defendants, or at least some of
them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlaw-
ing recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes; they
must have known that they were acting in defiance of all interna-
tional law when in complete deliberation they carried out their de-
signs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case alone, it
would appear that the maxim has an application to the present
facts.
[It] is argued that the pact does not expressly enact that such
wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such
wars. To the extent the same is true with regard to the laws of
war contained in the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibiting re-
sort to certain methods of waging war. These included the inhu-
mane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned
weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and similar matters.
Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long before the
date of the Convention; but since 1907 they have certainly been
crimes, punishable as offenses against the laws of war; yet the
Hague Convention nowhere designates such practices as crimi-
nal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a
court to try and punish offenders. For many years past, however,
military tribunals have tried and punished individuals guilty of
violating the rules of land warfare laid down by this Convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war
are doing that which is equally illegal, and of much greater mo-
ment than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague Convention.
In interpreting the words of the pact, it must be remembered that
international law is not the product of an international legisla-
ture, and that such international agreements as the Pact of Paris
have to deal with general principles of law, and not with admin-
istrative matters of procedure. The law of war is to be found not
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which
Vol. 9
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gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general
principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military
courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows
the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do
no more than express and define for more accurate reference the
principles of law already existing.
The principal objection appeared to be in the difficulty of de-
fining the acts which would constitute "aggression," rather than any
doubt as to the criminality of aggressive war. The preamble to the
League of Nations 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
national Disputes, ("Geneva Protocol"), after "recognizing the soli-
darity of the members of the international community," declared
that "a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity
and is an international crime." It went on to declare that the con-
tracting parties were "desirous of facilitating the complete applica-
tion of the system provided in the Covenant of the League of
Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between the states and
of ensuring the repression of international crimes." The Protocol
was recommended to the members of the League of Nations by a
unanimous resolution in the Assembly of the 48 members of the
League. These members included Italy and Japan, but Germany
was not then a member of the League.
Although the Protocol was never ratified, it was signed by the
leading statesmen of the world, representing the vast majority of
the civilized States and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evi-
dence of the intention to brand aggressive war as an international
crime.
[Many] expressions of opinion, [and declarations] solemnly
made, reinforced the construction which the Tribunal placed upon
the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not merely
illegal, but is criminal. The prohibition of aggressive war de-
manded by the conscience of the world, finds its expression in the
series of Pacts and Treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred.
It is also important to remember that Article 227 of the Treaty
of Versailles provided for the constitution of a special tribunal,
composed of representatives of five of the Allied and Associated
Powers which had been belligerents in the First World War op-
posed to Germany, to try the former German Emperor "for a
supreme Offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties." The purpose of this trial was expressed to be "to vindi-
cate the solemn obligations of international undertakings, and the
validity of international morality." In Article 228 of the Treaty, the
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German Government expressly recognized the right of the Allied
Powers "to bring before military tribunals persons accused of hav-
ing committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war."
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the
actions of sovereign states, and provides no punishment for individ-
uals; and further, that where the act in question is an act of State,
those who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are pro-
tected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opin-
ion of the Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That
international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon states has long been recognized.
The principle of international law, which under certain cir-
cumstances, protects the representatives of a State, cannot be ap-
plied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in appropri-
ate proceedings. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declares: "The
official position of defendants, whether as heads of State, or respon-
sible officials in government departments shall not be considered as
freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating punishment."
On the other hand, the very essence of the Charter is that indi-
viduals have international duties which transcend the national obli-
gations of obedience imposed by the individual State. He who
violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing
action moves outside its competence under international law.
It was also submitted on behalf of these defendants that in do-
ing what they did they were acting under the orders of Hitler, and
therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts committed by
them in carrying out these orders. The Charter specifically pro-
vides in Article 8: "The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to
orders of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment."
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of
all nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation
of the international law of war has never been recognized as a de-
fense to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here provides,
the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true
test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most
nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice
was in fact possible.
Vol. 9
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V. THE LAW AS TO THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY
In the previous recital of the facts relating to aggressive war, it
is clear that planning and preparation had been carried out in the
most systematic way at every stage of the history.
Planning and preparation are essential to the making of war.
In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a crime under in-
ternational law. The Charter defines this offense as planning, prep-
aration, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression "or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment . . . of the foregoing." The indictment follows this distinc-
tion. Count one charges the common plan or conspiracy. Count
two charges the planning and waging of war. The same evidence
has been introduced to support both counts.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence establishes the
common planning to prepare and wage war by certain of the de-
fendants. It is immaterial to consider whether a single conspiracy
to the extent and over the time set out in the indictment has been
conclusively proved. Continued planning, with aggressive war as
the objective, has been established beyond doubt ....
VI. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The Tribunal proposes, therefore, to deal quite generally with
the question of war crimes, and to refer to them later when examin-
ing the responsibility of the individual defendants in relation to
them. Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered,
not only in defiance of the well-established rules of international
law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of human-
ity. Civilian populations in occupied territories suffered the same
fate. Whole populations were deported to Germany for the pur-
poses of slave labor upon defense works, armament production and
similar tasks connected with the war effort. Hostages were taken in
very large numbers from the civilian populations in all the occu-
pied countries, and were shot as suited the German purposes. Pub-
lic and private property was systematically plundered and pillaged
in order to enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense of the
rest of Europe. Cities and towns and villages were wantonly de-
stroyed without military justification or necessity. . ..
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(F) The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity
The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the Defini-
tion which it gives both of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
With respect to war crimes, however, as has already been pointed
out, the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were
already recognized as war crimes under international law. They
were covered by Articles 46, 50, 52 and 56 of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46 and 51 of the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1929. That violation of these provisions constituted crimes
for which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled
to admit of argument.
But it is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in
this case, because of the "general participation" clause in Article 2
of the Hague Convention of 1907. That clause provided: "The pro-
visions contained in the regulations (rules of land warfare) referred
to in Article 1 as well as in the present convention do not apply
except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belliger-
ents are parties to the convention." Several of the belligerents in
the recent war were not parties to this convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this
question. The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention
expressly stated that it was an attempt "to revise the general laws
and customs of war," which it thus recognized by all civilized na-
tions and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and cus-
tom of war which are referred to in Article 6(b) of the Charter.
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt
whatever that political opponents were murdered in Germany
before the war, and that many of them were kept in concentration
camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of
terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases
was organized and systematic. The policy of persecution, repres-
sion, and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939,
who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruth-
lessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the same period
is established beyond all doubt. To constitute crimes against hu-
manity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have
been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that
revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been
satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in con-
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nection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make
a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were crimes against
humanity within the meaning of the Charter, but from the begin-
ning of the war of 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale,
which were also crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhu-
mane acts charged in the indictment, and committed after the be-
ginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all
committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive
war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.
DIsPOSITION AND OUTCOME OF THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
Count 2 Count 3 Count 4
Count I Crime vs. War Crimes vs.

























Leadership Corps, Nazi Party
SA
Reich Cabinet
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Death I
Life
Guilty Guilty Acquitted Acquitted imprisonment
2
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Death
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Death
Acquitted Guilty Guilty Death
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Death
Acquitted Guilty Guilty Death
Acquitted Guilty Guilty Guilty Death
Acquitted Guilty Death
Life
Acquitted Guilty Guilty Guilty imprisonment




Guilty Guilty Guilty imprisonment
Twenty
Acquitted Guilty years
Acquitted Acquitted Guilty Guilty Death
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty Death
Acquitted Acquitted None 4
Acquitted Guilty Guilty Guilty Death
Twenty
Acquitted Acquitted Guilty Guilty years
Fifteen
Guilty Guilty Guilty Guilty years
Acquitted Acquitted Acquitted None 5







International Law Journal: Table of Contents
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
General Staff and High Command Not declared criminal
1. Committed suicide after sentencing and before execution.




6. Tried in abstentia; if he is found, the penalty is subject to reduction by the Control Council.
APPENDIX E
CONVENTION ON THE NONAPPLICABILITY OF
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY'
Article I
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, ir-
respective of the date of their commission:
a. War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of August 8, 1945 and con-
firmed by Resolutions 3(I) of February 13, 1946, and 95(I) of
December 11, 1946, of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, particularly the 'grave breaches' enumerated in the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the protection of war victims;
b. Crimes against humanity whether committed in time of
war or in time of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of August 8, 1945,
and confirmed by resolutions 3(1) of February 13, 1946 and 95(I) of
December 11, 1946, of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, of apartheid, and the crime of genocide as defined in the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domes-
tic law of the country in which they were committed.
Article II
If any of the crimes mentioned in article I are committed, the
provisions of this Convention shall apply to representatives of the
state authority and private individuals who, as principals or accom-
plices, participate in or who directly incite others to the commission




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/1
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespec-
tive of the degree of completion, and to representatives of the state
authority who tolerate their commission.
Article III
The states parties to the present Convention undertake to
adopt all necessary domestic measures, legislative or otherwise,
with a view to making possible the extradition, in accordance with
international law, of the persons referred to in article II of this Con-
vention.
Article IV
The states parties to the present Convention undertake to
adopt, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes,
any legislative or other measures necessary to insure that statutory
or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and punish-
ment of the crimes referred to in articles I and II of this Convention
and that, where they exist, such limitations shall be abolished.
Article V
This Convention shall, until December 31, 1969, be open for
signature by any state member of the United Nations or member of
any of its specialized agencies or of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, by any state party to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and by any other state which has been invited by
the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to
this Convention.
Article VI
This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of
ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
Article VII
This Convention shall be open to accession by any state re-
ferred to in article V. Instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article VIII
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the nineteenth
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day after the date of the deposit with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each state ratifying this Convention or acceding to it
after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification or accession,
the Convention shall enter into force on the nineteeth day after the
date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article IX
1. After the expiry of a period of ten years from the date on
which this Convention enters into force, a request for the revision
of the Convention may be made at any time by any contracting
party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide
upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.
APPENDIX F
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ISRAEL V EICHMANNI:
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi functionary of German or Austrian
nationality, who was involved in the Nazi murders in Germany and
Austria of large numbers of Jewish persons of German, Polish, and
other nationalities prior to the 1945 defeat of Germany, escaped to
Argentina. There he was tracked down by Israeli nationals (it was
doubtful whether officials or private persons), seized, and abducted
to Israel. Argentina, while disclaiming any condonation of the
crimes of which Eichmann was accused, complained to the Security
Council, which declared that "acts such as that under considera-
tion, which affect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore
cause international friction, may, if repeated, endanger interna-
tional peace and security, [and requested the Government of Israel]
to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the rules of international law."2 Argentina
1. 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jerusalem 1961).
2. See Letter from the Representative of Argentina addressed to the President of the
Security Council, dated June 10, 1960, U.N. Doc. S/4334, at 24 (1960). For the text of the
Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic Addressed to the Em-
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did not, however, demand the return of Eichmann, and by a joint
communique issued August 3, 1960 by the Argentine and Israeli
governments, they resolved "to regard as closed the incident which
arose out of the action taken by citizens of Israel which infringed
the fundamental rights of the State of Argentina."3
Eichmann was tried in Israel under Israel's Nazi Collaborators
(punishment) Law, enacted after Israel became a state in 1948, con-
victed, and executed after the judgment was confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Israel on appeal in 1962. The Court found that
national law would prevail over international law in an Israeli
court, but examined the international law question at length.
EXCERPTS FROM THE OPINION
11. From the point of view of International law, the power of
the State of Israel to enact the law in question or Israel's "right to
punish" is based, with respect to the offenses in question, on a dual
foundation: the universal character of the crimes in question and
their specific character as intended to exterminate the Jewish peo-
ple. . ..
12. The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are not crimes
under Israel alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of
mankind and shocked the conscience of nations, are grave offenses
against the law of nations itself (delicta juris gentium). Therefore,
so far from international law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of
countries with respect to such crimes, international law is, in the
absence of an International Court, in need of the judicial and legis-
lative organs of every country to give effect to its criminal interdic-
tions and to bring the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to try
crimes under international law is universal ....
[Here the court discussed piracy and instances of universality
jurisdiction over war crimes. It also referred to genocide as having
become a crime under international law prior to the Genocide Con-
vention. The court held that the limitation in the Genocide Con-
vention, article 6, to trial before the court of the territory was a
bassy of Israel on June 8, 1960, see U.N. Doc. S/4336, at 35 (1960). For the Israeli reply, see
U.N. Doc. S/4342 (1960). The Security Council's Resolution appears in 15 U.N. SCOR
(868th mtg.) 24, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
3. Reprinted in Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 59 (D.C. Jerusa-
lem 1961).
4. See id. at 24-26.
5. Id. at 26.
6. Id.
93
International Law Journal: Table of Contents
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
treaty rule only, applicable only to offenses committed after the Ge-
nocide Convention entered into force in 1951.]
26. It is superfluous to add that the "crime against the Jewish
people," which constitutes the crime of "genocide," is nothing but
the gravest type of "crime against humanity" (and all the more so
because both under Israeli law and under the Convention a special
intention is requisite for its commission, an intention that is not
required for the commission of a "crime against humanity").
Therefore, all that has been said in the Nuremberg principles about
"crimes against humanity" applies afortiori to "crimes against the
Jewish people . . ..
27. It is indeed difficult to find a more convincing instance of
a just retroactive law than the legislation providing for the punish-
ment of war criminals and [perpetrators of crimes] against human-
ity and against the Jewish people, and all the reasons justifying the
Nuremberg Judgments justify eo ipse the retroactive legislation of
the Israel legislator . . . .The accused in this case is charged with
the implementation of the plan for the "final solution of the prob-
lem of the Jews." Can anyone in his right mind doubt the absolute
criminality of such acts... ?I
28. The contention of learned counsel for the defense that it
is not the accused but the State on whose behalf he had acted who
is responsible for his criminal acts is only true as to its second part.
It is true that under international law Germany bears not only
moral, but also legal, responsibility for all the crimes that were
committed as its own "acts of State," including the crimes attrib-
uted to the accused. But that responsibility does not detract one
iota from the personal responsibility of the accused for his acts
9
The repudiation of the argument of "act of State" is one of the
principles of international law that were acknowledged by the
Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and were unani-
mously affirmed by the United Nations Assembly in its Resolution
of December 11, 1946 . . .
30. We have discussed at length the international character
7. Id. at 41.
8. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 47.
10. Id. at 47-48.
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of the crimes in question because this offers the broadest possible,
though not the only, basis for Israel's jurisdiction according to the
law of nations . . .
41. It is an established rule of law that a person being tried
for an offense against the laws of a State may not oppose his trial by
reason of the illegality of his arrest or of the means whereby he was
brought within the jurisdiction of that State. The courts in Eng-
land, the United States and Israel have constantly held that the cir-
cumstances of the arrest and the mode of bringing the accused into
the territory of the State have no relevance to his trial, and they
have consistently refused in all instances to enter upon an examina-
tion of these circumstances ....
50. Indeed, there is no escaping the conclusion that the ques-
tion of the violation of international law by the manner in which
the accused was brought into the territory of a country arises at the
international level, namely, the relations between the two countries
concerned alone, and must find its solution at such level. .... 3
52. According to the existing rule of law there is no immunity
for a fugitive offender save in the one and only case where he has
been extradited by the asylum State to the requesting State for a
specific offence, which is not the offence for which he was being
tried. The accused was not surrendered to Israel by Argentina, and
the State of Israel is not bound by any agreement with Argentina to
try the accused for any other specific offence . . . and the accused
cannot compel a foreign sovereign State to give him protection
against its will. The accused was a wanted war criminal when he
escaped to Argentina by concealing his true identity. Only after he
was kidnapped and brought to Israel was his identity revealed. Af-
ter negotiations between the two Governments, the Government of
Argentina waived its demand for his return and declared that it
viewed the incident as closed. The Government of Argentina
thereby refused conclusively to grant the accused any sort of pro-
tection. The accused has been brought to trial before the Court of a
State which charges him with grave offences against its laws. The
accused has no immunity against this trial and must stand trial in
I1. Id. at 49.
12. Id. at 59.
13. Id. at 70.
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accordance with the indictment.' 4
APPENDIX G
TEXT OF THE DRAFT CODE OF OFFENSES AGAINST
THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND'
Article 1
Offenses against the peace and security of mankind, as defined
in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the re-
sponsible individuals shall be punished.
Article 2
The following acts are offenses against the peace and security
of mankind:
1) Any act of aggression, including the employment by the au-
thorities of a State of armed forces against another State for
any purpose other than national or collective self-defense
or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a com-
petent organ of the United Nations.
2) Any threat by the authorities of a State to resort to an act of
aggression against another State.
3) The preparation by the authorities of a State of the employ-
ment of armed force against another State for any purpose
other than national or collective self-defense or in pursu-
ance of a decision or recommendation of a competent or-
gan of the United Nations.
4) The organization, or the encouragement of the organiza-
tion by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its
territory for incursions into the territory of another State,
or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its
own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed
bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of
departure for incursions into the territory of another State,
as well as direct participation in or support of such incur-
sions.
5) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
14. Id. at 76.
1. 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 9, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
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State of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another
State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of orga-
nized activities calculated to foment civil strife in another
State.
6) The undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration
by the authorities of a State of organized activities calcu-
lated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.
7) Acts by the authorities of a State or violations of its obliga-
tions under a treaty which is designed to ensure interna-
tional peace and security by means of restrictions or
limitations on armaments, or on military training, or on
fortifications, or of other restrictions of the same character.
8) The annexation by the authorities of a State of territory be-
longing to another State, by means of acts contrary to inter-
national law.
9) The intervention by the authorities of a State in the internal
or external affairs of another State, by means of coercive
measures of an economic or political character in order to
force its will and thereby obtain advantages of any kind.
10) Acts by the authorities of a State or by private individuals
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnic, racial or religious group as such, including:
(i) Killing members of the group;
(ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(iv) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group;
(v) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group;
(vi) Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation or persecutions, committed
against any civilian population on social, political, ra-
cial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities
of a State or by private individuals acting at the insti-
gation or with the toleration of such authorities.
11) Acts in violation of the laws or customs of war.
12) Acts which constitute:
(i) Conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined in
the preceding paragraphs of this article, or
(ii) Direct incitement to commit any of the offenses
defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article; or
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(iii) Complicity in the commission of any of the offenses
defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article; or
(iv) Attempts to commit any of the offenses defined in the
preceding paragraphs of this article.
Article 3
The fact that a person acted as Head of State, as a responsible
governmental official does not relieve him of responsibility for
committing any of the offenses defined in this code.
Article 4
The fact that a person charged with an offense defined in this
code acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior
does not relieve him of responsibility in international law if, in the
circumstances at the time, it was possible for him not to comply
with that order.
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